United States problems in Eastern Asia and the role of the Seventh Fleet by Harlow, R. J.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
1964
United States problems in Eastern Asia and the role
of the Seventh Fleet
Harlow, R. J.












avml Postdraduat* Sckoal ^*^
^ITED gXATES PRQMMS m gASMaUl ASIA




Faculty of tho School of Intoraational Sorvico
of Tho Aaarican Univartlty
la Partial FulfHl««it of








UyinSD STATES PR0MJSH3 331 EASTERIi A3IA




Facylty of the School of Xiit«f&«itloA»3. Sorvieo
of Thm AnorieaA l&iivorsity
in Partial FulflllwoAt of











The conclusion of World War II brought into clear
focus two facts for the United States: warfare had entered
a new era with nuclear weapons and the eoergence of Connu-
nist China brought a direct challenge to United States
foreign policy* To meet the Chinese threat the United
States has the Seventh Fleet as a lailitary tool to help
implement political decisicm* This thesis examines the
relevance of the Seventh Fleet as a military-political tool.
Few direct sources in book form on Seventh Fleet are
to be found* Sources of information were: Congressional
Record, United States Departm^&t of State l^lletins, news
media. United States Naval Institute Proceedings, and
Chinese periodicals*
The conclusions regarding this Fleet are: it aug-
ments SAC as a deterrent force} it is an ideal flexible
political-military tool at the brushfire war level; and it
is generally impotent to counter the political and psycho-
logical guerrilla warfare being conducted in Southeast Asia*
The Seventh Fleet is largely circximscribed by the nature of
this conflict, but it is still a valid force to the poli-
tician within the limits of its mission.
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INTRODUCTIO*
Historically the imited States has had important in-
terests and extensive contacts with the Far East* CoMmodore
Perry* s visit to Japan, control of the Philippines, involve-
ment in the Boxer Rebellion, oriental immigration problems,
military and commercial interests, and deep involvement in
World War II all reflect these interests*
The Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902, which effected a
complete readjustment of the balance of power in the Far
East, set the stage for Japanese expanaioat which culminated
in World War II* This alliance essentially established the
united States as the primary western power to counter
Japanese ambitions* United States diplcnnacy of the period
largely, and logically, stemmed from the weak American mili-
tary power position in the area* The Root-Takahira Executive
Agreement of November 30, 1906, was a product of this weak-
ness. President Theodore Roosevelt was a realist who sought
**concessions in exchange for accepting what he did not have
the military strength to prevent*** Today, the United
States diplomacy in the Far East is based on a f>osture of
military strength; however, the grave problems which the
Thomas A* Bailey, A Diplomatic History of the
American People (seventh edition; New Yorkt Appleton-
Century-Crofts , 1964), p* 526*
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2United States is c<mfrontftd with in the area cannot be
solved by aiilitary strength alone*
These problems are the result of the collision be-
tween western technology, ideas and culture with that of the
peoples of Asia* The problems have climaxed in the post-*
World War II struggle between the interests, goals and ob-
jectives of inflamed nationalism (coupled with the '*rising
expectations" of underdeveloped areas), and the political
objectives of the united States to see stability, gradual
change and a "status quo'* of American power in the area*
With the Chinese Communist Party ^s success in consoli-
dation of power on the mainland of Asia in October, 1949,
and the subsequent Sino-Soviet rift, the primary antagonist
for the United States in the Far £ast is Communist China*
The imseen enemy is poverty, illiteracy, nationalism, anti-
white colonialism and other real but nebulous forces which
create conflict in the area*
Research on the subject has led to the following con-
clusions t
1* The basic conflict in the Par Sast is generated
by intellectual elites and expanded rapidly to the masses by
modcurn communications* This conflict manifests itself in
"rising expectations" for change in social and economic
spheres and the demands for change are not being met*
2* Communism, per se, is a "label" which promises
s-do biM alscp ,iw
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3dynamic change. Tha peasant can identify himself with
Coammisn--»democracy is alien in nature and scope* Many of
the CoHasunist leaders claim to be "purist" in their ideology;
however, nationalism generally prevails* The world--wide
monolithic Communist movement has been fragmented by the
forces of nationalism*
3* Communist China does not factually represent an
extension of the "institutionalised" cold war between the
Soviet Union and the united States* Due to the divergent
national interests of the Soviet Union and Communist China,
it would be a fatal error for the Uhited States to assume
the cold war objectives of Peking and Moscow were identical*
It is reasonable to state that the overall Communist move~
ment objectives in the Far Bast are threefold and can be
summarized as control of
i
a* The manpower of China*
b* The industrial capacity of Japan*
3
c* The resources of Southeast Asia*
2The historical evolution of the Sino«>Soviet schism
is a classic example* £ach proclaims to be a defender of
the true faith* For pertinent comments on "nationalism" vs*
"Communism" in Asia see: "America's Primary Interests in
Asia," Department of State Bulletin , Vol* 31, p* 191* This
article is essentially a transcript of the Columbia Broad-
casting System television program "Crossroads Asia,'' August
1, 1954, in which lender Secretary of State Walter B* Smith
was interviewed regarding problems in Asia*
"America, Japan and the Future of the Pacific,"
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44. Connunlst China is the greatest military power of
the underdeveloped nations. The United States represents the
pinnacle of economic, military and political development
which is thwarting the Chinese Communists from attaining
their political objectives; therefore, it is the prime target
of Red China.
5. To impose political decision in the international
arena, military power or threat is still valid; however, the
form and nature of military power has hmitn greatly modified
due to the advent of nuclear weapons and the mode of conflict
selected by revolutionaries in Asia.
6. National interest is the key to political action-—
4Ideology the modifier.
7. Because the Dhited States is the world's foremost
seapower, one of the primary military weapons used to project
its power to influence political events in eastern Asia has
been the Seventh Fleet stationed in the Far £ast. During the
post«-war period, the role of the Seventh Fleet has not only
been military but psychological and, to a lesser degree.
United States Department of State Press Release 122 . Karch




4Winston Churchill's classic evaluation of the Soviet
Union's actions pertain. **I cannot forecast to you the
action of Russia. It is a riddle wrapped in a mystery in-
side an enigma; but perhaps there is a key. That key is
Riissiaa national interest." Winston Churchill, The Gathering
Storm (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1948), p. 449.
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5•conomic* Among its advantages are mobility, flexibility of
%#eapons, and the fact that it is not dependent upon fixed
bases located in foreign cowitries-^-all considerations which
have political implications*
This paper is concerned with the politiceil struggle
of the United States in the Far East since the end of World
War II and the use of naval seapower to assist in achieving
political decision by military means* Because military
policy and war are a continuation of political policy '*by
5
other Bieans** the paramount interests are political* It is
the objective of this paper to view the Sevcoith Fleet from
the point of view of the United States Department of State
and attempt to evaluate this naval unit as a relevant military-
political tool* Due to political, economic and military fac<*
tors, the focal point of conflict in Asia is between the
United States and Communist China«-»and all other issues are
peripheral but contributory to the contest*
5Carl von Clausewitz, Principles of War t trans* Hans
W* Gatzke (Harrisburg, Pennsylvania: iTTie^hilitary Service
Publishing Company, 1942), p* 6*
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XmJTBD STATES POST-WORLD WAR II
PROBLEMS IN THE FAR EAST
X. THE OVERALL DILEMMA IN ASIA
Prior to the conclusion of World War II, a&lnland
Aala was largely under the control and occupation of Japan*
The Japanese and their *'Co*Pro8p€Mrlty Sphere" were, for the
most part, hated by the peoples of the occupied countries,
but the Japanese had proven the white man was not Invincible.
This was a lesson that was not soon forgotten*
As the Japanese moved out of their conquered terrl-^
torles, a power vacuim was created* The European colonial
po%#ers were unable to return In sufficient strength to re-
assert their c<mtrol, thus the forces of revolution and
change swept Asia* The overwhelming poverty of the masses,
often combined with Ineffectual or corrupt Indigenous govem-
mcmts, created fertile ground for Communism* Faced with
the cold war and Its Inherent Ideological conflict, the
In the early po8t--World War II period. Communism In
Asia was largely Identified with the Soviet tMlon* For
example: the defeat of Japan caused a *'power vacuum In
eastern Asia which Communism, that Imperialistic arm of
Soviet Russia, was quick to fill*" William J* Selsold,
"Japan t Asset of the Free World," Department of State
Bulletin . Vol* 26, pp. 490>-494* From an address made before
the Knights of Columbus at Baltimore, Maryland, March 23,
1952*
>
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7IMit«d Stat«ft frequently finds American foreign policy in
the unenviable position of supporting ruling regiaies simply
on the ground that they are anti-<ommunist« At the same
time, the bulk of the populace are violently opposed to
their government, and the ruling class can renuiin in power
only through "police state" tactics*
The fundamentals of united States foreign policy in
the Far East and the problems such policy is designed to
cope with have remained relatively stable since 1950* Amcmg
2the objectives aret
1« Freedom for all peoples*
2* Equal partnership of nations within the principles
of the united Nations Charter*
3* Security from aggression, overt or covert*
4* Use of peaceful processes to settle disputes*
5* Material well being for all*
6* Cultural exchange*
7* Good neighbors*
The obstacles to successful American policy includes grind-
ing poverty, lack of capital plant, political inexperience,
military weakness, suspici^i of each other and the west,
lack of technical know-how and a host of similar probleou*
2Dean Rusk, "Fundaa«itals of Far Eastern Policy,"
Department of State Bulletin , Vol* 23, pp* 465-468. From an
address at 'B^e National Convention of American Veterans of
World War lit *^ Cleveland, Ohio, September 9, 1950*
T«< ^pilloq A^ltfiot tim^'^^^^mA A»iU% s/t!iiukin^'^ «4»^«it b*#lJ0
YX^i«Ia ••«i.f*i ^allMt QuJL^iiQq^s io ae«.Jl«^ •i^Xramau mtU
• a9l:t9Ai "•i«^c •olXoq'* ti^itoruU xSjm
^mmm\ .Oe^X s^iit oXdA: .si b«aLM»i »T»i{ rlilw •qoo
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8A clo8« Study of Uhltttd Stat«s policy in the Far East
3
will revaal surprising consistency* This is, at times,
obscured by political acc\isations primarily heard during
election campaigns or in times of international crisis when
it is politically expedient to criticise foreign policy*
The popular image of American foreign policy frc»quently has
concepts which are **objectiYe8 beyond the traditional scope
4
of foreign policy^ and may include the following:
1* Our freedom is not secure unless American ideals
are shared*
2* The United States will not impose its ideals or
way of life on others*
3* Americans have no territorial ambitions*
4* We support the growth of free political institu-
tions •
These four objectives are sometimes "idealised" by the Ameri-
can press as "democracy" under export label*
However, democracy in the liberal tradition requires
certain "pre-conditions" to survive* A few of these ares
3Among the best sources for authoritative background
on American foreign policy are the studies prepared for the
Ukiited States Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations* Fox-
example: "united States Foreign Policy—-Asia, '^ Study No. 5,
1 November 1959, by Conlon Associates Limited; "Utiited States
Foreign Policy, Basic Aims of United States Policy, Study
No* 7," by Council of Foreign Relations, November 25, 1959*
Both publications are printed by the United states Government
Printing Office*
August Heclcscher, "Xftiited States Policy Objectives,"
Foreign Policy Bulletin , Vol. 39, No* 6 (December 1, 1959),
p« ^3*
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9considerable experience In self-"government, majority rule
concept, a high rate of literacy, tolerance on the part of
the parties in power to give up power on a free election
basis, a well-informed public opinion, a relatively decent
standard of living, an able and experienced bureaucracy, a
homogeneous and integrated society, the maintenance of peace
for a substantial period, and a strong and able middle class*
In some areas where we "wishfully** want democracy in the Far
East, not one single element of those required is present*
Security in the form of major military, economic and social
control or aid is necessary in direct proportion to the lack
of the requixed elements listed above in a given situational
base*
Basic to the American program is foreign aid in one
form or another* Possible gains have been, and are, fre-
quently offset by corrupt administration of aid, population
increases nullifying any positive increases in standards of
living, propaganda that aid is a form of neo-colonialism,
etc* Aid frequently is used to promote industry; however,
the goals of the industry may not SMet the true needs of the
people*
There are two particular risks in the attempted
imitation of a Western industrialized economy by
an underdeveloped one* First, in an age of
virulent nationalism every government wants to be
armed like a great power • • * • Secondly, the west
—especially the United States—presents a far too
modern model for Asia's needs, one in which the










emphasis Is no longer on production but on consump-
tion* The American model discourages savings .^
In spite of prodigious efforts and great aspirations
on the part of the backward nations, most appear to be
surely failing in their attempts to meet the challenge of
"rising expectations." In 1956, the industrialized free
societies enjoyed a gross national product ten times as
great as the less-industrialized free societies, and by 1976
(a 20-year period) it was likely to become fifteen times as
6great* This should not be unexpected, for it is estimated
that for a given econ<»iy to "take off" and be self-sustaining,
a surplus of 12 per cent to 15 pw: cent of the gross national
product is necessary. Put in a different perspective, Adlai
Stevenson, in the 7 February 1959 issue of The Saturday
Review , wrote that the Atlantic Community, with 16 per cent
of the world's population, enjoyed 70 per cent of the world's
wealth 1 One key facet of the problem, of course, is the
population explosion which is wiping out many gains made by
the underdeveloped nations.
A further general comment about the population explo-
sion is necessary as it provides one of the greatest barriers
5Raymond Aron, "Asia: Between Malthus and Marx,"
Encounter (August, 1954), p« 56.
Rockefeller Brothers Fund, Foreign Economic Policy
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to effective Uhlted States policy In Asia* The population
explosion may deny backward nations the opportunity to In-
prove their lot, regardless of what help the Industrialized
nations give* In Asia, the Malthuslan theory works almost
perfectly* The British experience In India and the present
Coinmunlst Chinese problem are examples* In the latter case,
the gross national product Is barely keeping ahead of the
net Increase In population* The result 1st running as fast
as they ctn-^in place* Or* John Rock states that we have
reached our ''most critical point In history*" He saysi
The U*S*: This country can handle twice Its popu-
lation without undue trouble, but we can't handle the
political Impact of other leunds doubling their popu-
lation* More than half the world goes to bed hungry
every night now* More and more people are beginning
to realise that this Implicit threat lsn*t anything
to play with* We auiy have reached the most critical
point In [mankind's] history* The growth rate Is as
urgent a problem as nuclear energy*'
Sach day that passes finds a greater awareness and
understanding of the critical problems posed by the so-
Q
called "population explosion*"
Another problem area Is cosmiunlcatlon* Not In the
mechanical or technical sense of coauuunicatlon , but In the
sense of the exchange of Ideas with each side completely
7
Dr. John Rock In an article on birth control* Life
Maqaslne (May 10, 1963), p* 40B*
fi
One of the more comprehensive stiadles of the popula-
tion problem Iss Richard M* Fagley, The Population Sxploslon
and Christian Responsibility (New York: Colliers, 1962)*
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undarstanding and responding with f««ling« The latter emo-
tion is generally lacking* Understanding plus feeling or
complete identification with the problem equals reinforced
education. This is one of the key areas in which the United
States Peace Corps can make a significant contribution*
Due to lack of communicati^i with understanding and
feeling, the United States has frequently failed to communi-'
cate in underdeveloped areas and Communism has succeeded.
Communism generally talks the **same language" of the peasant
but democracy, as we advertise it, is completely alien in
scope and content to the '*nass man** of the world. It is too
**Utopian''{ he wants food and action'-«>not the right to vote.
The average citizens of the industrialized world, and par-
ticularly Americans, have no concept of the pressures for
survival that are institutionalized throughout the countries
described as "the backward nations." We frequently cannot
communicate.
For United States foreign policy to solve the dilemma
it is faced with in the Par Cast, major reforms must be
initiated by the peoples of Asia themselves. They must con-
trol population, institute land reform, break down social
barriers of caste and class, revise taxation, wisely use the
9Michael Sdwardes, Asia in the Balance (Baltisioref
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aid given » refrain fron anti-«white propagandising, craata
sacurity for thair paopXas and attract foraign capital in-
vaatmanta by pledging protection for such invastiaant—and
the iiat goes on indefinitely*
In eoaclusion, the l^oULted Statea ia faced with grave
and enduring pr^lema which conbat effective political action
on our part* At the saaie tine* American foreign policy ia
lOMHiuivocally coanitted to reaolution of the Asian political
problaa for the foreseeable future*
Cowwunist Oiina and Foraosa
The political problens posed by Conninist China are
central to the issues which nust be resolved by the United
States in the Far Sast* As the Chinese Coomunist Party
gained in strength to the point where Soviet ideological
leadership could be chall«iged and overt military action
against India beca»e feasible, its national objectives be-
casM SKkra clearly discernible* Its major goals include:
1* Security, internal and external*
2* Adequate food supplies*
3* Establishment of a modern industrial base inde-
pendent of foreign aid*
4* Absorption of Formosa*
5* Leadership of the Communist world*
6* Setting the ideological pattern for the CoBonmist
movement in underdeveloped countries*
7* Extension of Chinese borders to those of tradi-
tional China* ^v
^^Helmut G* Callis, "The Chinese-united States Stale-
mate," Current History . Decttoid^er 1959, p* 340*
CI
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8* Rttcognition in th« United Nations as th« "da
Jure" govarnmant of China*
9* Expansion of foreign trade*
10 • Domination of Asia*
II* To see the West suffer retribution for the
humiliation of China during the imperii
alistic era*
12* World--wide CcuMnunist revolution* ^^
The iiaBiediate conflict with American objectives can
be readily ascertained in the social* economic and political
areas* The strategic goals of the Uhited States primarily
found in the military spheres of responsibility can be
stated as folloi#S9
America's broad interests in the Par Pacific and
Sastem Asia might be summed up under three headings*
One is to insure its own continental security by
command of the Pacific Ocean, which is best conserved
by a defense line on the island chain along the Cast
Asian shore* Another is to prevent the expansion of
Communist power to either mainland or island areas
now in the Free World* A third is to maintain the
ready capability of striking powerful strategic blows
at possible enemies in the r'ar 2ast, in reprisal for
surprise attack on the united States or one of its
allies *X2
thm areas of direct conflict are appar^it within the
military sphere and are greatly intensified in the economic
and ideological fields* Thus, we find the adlitary, economic
11A limited statement of Chinese Communist objectives
can be found in J* Graham Parson's (Assistant Secretary of
State for Far Sast«a:n Affairs) testimony to the House Foreign
Affairs Committee on March 8, I960* i3epartmimt of State
bulletin « Vol* 1084, pp* 532«>537* For an expand'i^ discussion
Peprr o. Boyd, C9«wunist cy\i^^*B m^^<tP^ Policy (New Yorki
Frederick A* Praeger, 1962), pp* 85«>90*
12William H, Hessler, "Blue Water Around Red China,"
H* &• Haval Institute Proceedinqs (Febrtiary, 1953), p* 31.
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and psychological festars "jelling" into concrete political
problems which are compounded by the "hard line" attitudes
manifested by both the Uhited States and "Stalinist" China
vis«»ii«-vi8 each other*
Further complicating the questi(»i of China is the
Formosan issue* Public opinion is largely divided as how
best to resolve this dilemma; however, IMited States policy
has been explicit on the subject since June 27, 1950, when
by Presidential mandate the neutralization of Formosa became
13
effective through the policing action of the Seventh Fleet.
The President's use of land and naval forces for protection
purposes has many precedents* From 1812 to 1932, there were
14
no less than eighty-five recorded incidents*
The reaction of Communist China to this move by the
Uhited States was violent* The Seventh Fleet patrol in the
Taiwan Straits appeared to contradict President Truman's
statement of five months earlier* "The l%iited States govern-
ment will not pursue a course which will lead to involvement
13President of the Uhited States Heurry S* Truman's
statement placing American military forces in action in
Korea and the Seventh Fleet's policing mission in the Taiwan
Straits was released to the press June 27, 1950* The full
statement may be found in the Department of State Bulletin ,
Vol. 23, p* 5*
14United States Congress, House, Report 2495, 81st
C^igress, 2nd Session, Congressional Record , p* 67; or
Department of State Bul'letin . Vol* 23. pp. 177-178*
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la the civil conflict in China*** The impact on the
Chinese Comsimiat Party can be clearly seen by the following
news coverage!
New China News Agency* Peking, Hovenber 4, 1950*
There is no limit on United States aggressive ambi-
tions • • • • [The U* S* desires] to annex Korea • • »
invade China, rule Asia and conquer the world* United
States President Truman ordered • • • the Seventh
Fleet to invade Chinese Sea and carry out armed inter-
vention to prevent the liberation of Taiwan .^^
By 19S7, the Peking version became "June 27, 1950*
U* S* President Trvman announces armed intervention in Korea
17
and the military occupation of the island of Taiwan***
The Formosan question is more thoroughly covered in
Chapter II of this paper} however, its strategic military
significance might be further considered in light of General
Douglas HacArthur*s comments:
The entire Pacific Ocean has become a vast moat to
protect us as long as we hold it • • • • The holding
of » • • the western Pacific is entirely dependent
upon holding all the segments thereof • * • • For that
reason • • • under no circumstances must Formosa fall
under Communist control *^^
15Stat^sent by President Harry S* Trxsaan relcfcased to
the press January 5, 19S0* Department of State Bulletin ,
Vol. 22, p* 79*
16Survey of the Mainland China Press, trans* American
Consulate GeneraT7 Hong Kong, No* 4, Noveniser 5-6, 1950*
17Handbook on People's Chii^ (Peking: Foreign Lan-
guages Press, 1^57T7 p* 195* Lin English*
J
IdGeneral Douglas MacArthur in an address to the
Congress of the United States, April 19, 1951, Congressional
Record . Vol* 97, part 3, p, 4123.
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In stomation, Comsuiiist China represents the full
range of dynaadlc political probleas: it maintains an aggres-
sive military stance) it exploits psychological fanaticism;
it exists in an economic quagmire which breeds venom and un«-
rest towards the industrialised west{ and it has an avowed
aim of destruction of the western democratic political-
economic system epitomised by the XAiited States. The only
points of comfort in the situation are: (1) P^ing does not
possess nuclear weapons; (2) Red China is extremely weak in
seapower and air strength; (3) the growing Sino-Soviet con-
flict which has already produced major schisms in the Commu-
nist world; and (4) Communist China suffered a major economic
retreat with the failure of the "great leap forward" move-
ment* In contrast to Communist China, Formosa represents
much less of a political protblem* Tied to the United States
by treaty and dependent upon American political » military
and economic support, most problems with Formosa are minor*
Those problems %^ich do arise are generally resolved to the
mutual satisfaction of both parties and no major confliet-of-
interests are foreseen for the imawdiate fxxture*
During World War II, the western democracies en-
visioned Nationalist China as the powerful and friendly
anchor in the Far East* At the conclusion of the war, in a
•fltf bAt aoftsY al^M»i4 ftoiilw •xUq>«4ip aiA an a tx9 ^1
J«»w io taut
i»M»:i;fx« e b*JI (S) |liM|Mw ISSldtia tMStOq
y;«»v o. .>, i^e« ^'--'fto^q ybceiXs &. >^" 4*^1 1^
alflK>iiOM 9»tMi • te:«»llii« AAliiD isloUHaDD (») bftft I fallow ^«^A
^dvom "biMw:io^ q««i iA^ 'tli ^ ftiulls^ eri. ' :t«*i^:i
IB
swift chain of events, the cold war started, Comnunism swept
China, and the IMited States, in particular, urgently re->
quired support on its Pacific flank. The most practical and
obvious solution was to re-create a strong, sympathetic
Japan to assume the role that was to have be^n Nationalist
China's. Following the Korean War, the Japanese economic
recovery was successful and complete. The Japanese have
proven again that they are an intelligent and energetic
people* Their post-war recovery can be compared favorably
with that of West Germany's* "Japan's annual growth rate in
gross national product, %^ich is one of the highest in the
19
world today, reached 15% in 1961*" Not only is the new
industry of Japan efficient, but the product is of high
quality idiich can cc»Bpete on almost any market*
Yet, Japan's economic position today is similar to its
situation just prior to World War II—a demand for expanding
markets* Thus, Japan is sorely tesq^ted to flirt with Commu-
nist Chinese trade which has grave implications for the
United States Far Eastern policy* Today (1964), there are
some eighty Japanese firms doing business with Communist
China* As^ng the reasons for this trade ares first, there
is a belief that someday China will be a major market*
19Chitoshi Yanaga, "Japan's Role in the Free World,"
tJ* S* Naval War College Review , Vol* 16, No. 6, February
T96T, pTTT
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S#cond Is the fear that western £\iropean nations will iRove
into China and squeeze out Japan* Third is the willingness
20to sustain losses with the future prospects of large orders*
As Japan looked about for nctw markets, it was only
natural that China would be considered as soon as Japan had
freedom of choice after the 1951 treaty with the Uhited
States, In June 1952, the first trade agreement between
private Japanese businessmen and Red China took place* This
is logical since Japan certainly can identify China as a
former market->-before World War 11, 17*3 per cent of Japan's
21total export trade weis with China* Within eight months,
li0iiev€ur, the Red Chinese stated their bargaining position
for continued Japanese trade* The following political ends
are still the desired goals of Red China vis-^-vis Japan and
trade is definitely used as a **lever": Japan is to sever
ties with the United States, break relations with Nationalist
China, establish full diplomatic relations with Peking, and
trade on a government<*>to-government basis* Japan, to date,
has successfully resisted Commiinist Chinese pressures in tlie
^
^Ibid *. p* 14.











economic sphere prlniarily through United States understand-
22ing and support*
As Japan's capacity and production has increased
i
soaie of the markets "hardened" against Japanese goods* Her
Asiatic neighbors (excluding Red China) could not forget the
Japanese role in World War II and were reluctant to trade*
In the united States, particularly in the South, there was
narked resistance to Japanese products which took the form
23
of discriminatory legislation* Japan officially protested
the legislation and delivered a note to the United States
Government which reflected the probable reaction of the
Japanese people and its effect on foreign policy* One
specific result anticipated was inciting "neutralist" and
"left wing" elemants in Japan to step up attacks on the
Uhited States*
With the rise of the Connon Market and increased com-
petition throughout the "free world," it does not seen
reasonable that American domestic politics will welcone
22Early post-Korean War attitudes towards Japanese
trade can be found in U* S* Department of atate Press
Release 281 of May 23,"~19?5, entitled, '^^'Sbne Aspects of Our
I^ar Cast Policy"; and "Japan's Progress and Prospects,"
^•^- P^partm^t of State Bulletin t Vol* 30, pp* 513-517*
IlKTs article is essentially the address given by Deputy
Under Secretary of State Murphy to the Japan Society in
New York, New York, on March 18, 1955*
Sli Abel, "Boycott of Japan Upsets Officials,"
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Japanese manufactiirers in spite of an awareness on the part
of the American people of Japan's need* We must "not weigh
Japan's need of us against our need of Japan. We need each
other ."^^
It I therefore, appears inevitable that there will be
an increase in Sino-^apanese trade, which, in turn, will
reflect a more conciliatory attitude by Japan towards Red
China*
Before leaving the critical Japanese economic pictiire,
there has been a significant advance made by Japan in its
major problem regarding overpopulation*
Japan's birth rate is practically nothing today
• • • [reasons are that] it enjoys one of the
highest literacy rates in the world (98%) and there
is no religious inhibition to birth control or abor-
tion*25
This breakthrough assures Japan a favorable position for
economic competition in the Far Sast for the foreseeable
fut\u:e*
To more clearly assess the Uhited States position in
the Far East, the goals of Japan, our one bastion of economic
strength and the only model of modern industry and democracy
24Harold S* Quigley, "Japan, Ally for Peace,** Current







in Asla» mist be considered* While the goals of Connunist
Chine ( supra , pp* X3-I4) clearly represent those of an ag-
gressive revisionist state, the below-listed Japanese short
mad long-term goals reflect for the nost part a "status quo"
nation attitude which can be attributed to the favorable
economic atmosphere Japan enjoys and the vivid ii&pact on the
Japanese psyche due to the destruction and disastrous defeat
suffered by Japan in World War II* The goals include]
security by alliance or through the united Nations but, in
any event, not by large Japanese armed forces, avoidance of
war, continued economic prosperity, expansion of foreign
markets, unrestricted sources of raw materials and food-
stuffs, some form of democracy, internal stability, banning
26
of atomic weapons and retuum of the Ryukyu Islands to
27Japanese jurisdiction*
In view of Japanese national goeULs, it is clearly to
their advantage to maintain the present close ties with the
united States* The political problems faced by the U* S*
Department of State in Washington with regards to Japan have
largely generated from our own indoctrination in the
26
Yanaga, op * cit«, p* 11*
27John M* Allison, Ambassador to Japan, stated on
June 27, 1956, the UnitcKi States had "no intention of perma-
nent possession of the islands* ** U* ^* Department of State
Bulletin , Vol* 35*1, p* 60* *"
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immediate post-war period* We imposed a Constitution on
Japan wherein, by Article XX, the Japanese renounced the use
of force as a means of settling international disputes; and
it states that land, sea, air forces as well as other war
28potential will never be maintained* The fact that Japan
was disarmed has been publicly lamented on several occasions.
For example, in November 1953, Secretary of State Dulles
agreed with a speech made by the Vice President of the
United States, Richard "^ixon, who openly stated the United
29States had made an error regarding Japanese disarmament*
The American view that Japan should be militarily strong and
rearm hais been a recurrent theme with the increasing threat
30
of Communist China*
Today, the United States desires Js^an to reaurm for
its self-defense to reduce the American military burden in
the Far Bast* The Japanese Government cannot greatly in-
crease the sise of the "self defense** force due to strong
public opinion which is voiced in a democratic atmosphere*
This, in turn, is largely a legacy from American indoctrina-
tion during the post-war occupation* The present Japanese
28John K* Maki, Government and Politics in Japan (New
York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962), p* 247*
29John Foster Dulles, '^Disarmament of Japan," Depart-
ment of State Bulletin . November 24, 1953, Vol* 29, p* 788*
30Walter S* Robertson, "U* s* Policy Towards Japan,"





















militaury posture can be stated as:
Slowly I however, Japan has been building up her
defense forces until today her ground, air and mari-
ti»e self-defense forces total a quarter of a
million, comprising 13 ground divisions, 800 American-
designed Jet fighters, and a navy of two dosen de-
stroyers and six submarines, and plans for helicopter
carriers* She possesses no nuclear arms, which she
prefers not to o%m, nor does she permit the United
States to bring nuclear warheads into Japan* At the
present time, she is capable of a holding action for
30 days against a conventional invasion force* For
her security, she depends on the military might of the
United States through the Uhited States-Japan Security
Treaty which was signed in January 1960, and she pre-
fers to keep it this way for some time* Nevertheless,
Japan resiains the Far Eastern bastion against commu-
nism, and as such she coi.wributes toward the security
plans of the United States *^^
The last major political crisis with Japan took place
in May 1960, when the Kishi government renewed the American-
32Japanese "mutual cooperation and security" treaty* The
objectionable feature of this treaty to the average Japanese
citizen was that the Uhited States would still retain the
right to use bases in Japan* The treaty was ratified; how-
ever, the Kishi government fell, riots and violence ensued
31Yanaga, op * cit *, pp* 9-10*
32The evolution of post-World War II Japanese-
American security treaties can be found as follows: United
States-Japanese Security Treaty of September 8, 1951, De-
artment of State Bulletin , Vol* 25, pp* 464-465; Text of
he }^utuaT"Defense Assistance Agreement Between the United
States and Japan, March 8, 1954, Department of State
Bulletin , Vol* 30, pp* 520-525; and Treaty o?~Mutual Coop-
eration and Security Between the United States of America
and Japan, January 19, 1960, Department of State Bulletin ,
Vol* 42*1, pp* 184-198.
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and the proposed visit of President Sisenhower the following
33
month was cancelled.
However, of all the arguments for continued coopera-
tion with the United States, the greatest is security* he
Japanese suffer no illusions about the balance of power in
the Far East nor do the Red Chinese and Soviet denials of
imperialistic intentions dupe the Japanese* Since Japan
represents the greatest concentration of industrial power in
all Asia coupled with vast technical }cnowledge, it is appar-
ent that Japan is a prime Connunist target*
In summation, the key to the Japanese problem lies in
the field of economics, and since 1958 the Japanese govern-
ment's attitude has not changed to any rearked degree in
regeurd to Red China* It consistently '*leans" towards the
American view; but the need and desire for trade with Red
China remains* And this need is growing daily as her ex-
panding production requires markets* The remarks of John
Foste&r Dulles in 1954 are still valid today*
Japan must trade to live, and if the free nations
fail to make it possible for Japan to earn its way,
then inevitably, though reluctantly, her people would
turn elsewhere* This would be stupid from an economic
standpoint • • • from a political standpoint it re-
quires little imagination to visualize what would happen
if Russia, China and Japan became a united hostile
group in the Pacific*
It was difficult enough for the U* S* to defeat
33










Japan when Japan fought alone in the Pacific with
China its enemy and Russia neutral. The free world
nust 8h\an econonic policies which would press Japan
into becoming the ally or the tool of Communist China
and Soviet Russia. ^^
A commonly accepted proposition in international re-
lations is that two of the primary goals of any nation are:
(1) survival, and (2) growth. Keeping this in mind, note how
pertinent these remarks are:
But diplcMRiacy must plan for possible contingencies.
Peipinq has promised massive trade if the country
(Japan) denounces its s curity treaty with us. China
pledges aid in restoring sovereignty over AjAerican^-
occupied Okinawa. This impresses Japan's opposition
Socialists. Right now they are weak and their pros-
pects are poor. But any economic crisis might easily
catapult them into office. • • • as long as we can
keep (Japan's) trade balances relatively healthy, it
is almost certain a strongly pro-American administra-
tion will remain in office.
However, diplomacy cannot control the economics of
democracy. Any recession in the U. S. will be mirrored
in Japanese ballot boxes .... In Washington, the
Pentagon has a large say in relationships with Japan
• • • . [in Japan] the big voice is business; business
is survival .35
Japan's problem is readily discernible. The solutions
to it are difficult to find and, unfortunately for Japan and
the West, tend toward greater activity with the Communist
world* It might be noted that, while discussing the aspect
34
"Sec\irity in the Pacific," speech by John Foster
Dulles, June 11, 1954, United States Department of State
Bulletin . 30:921-923, June 28, 195^*
35
C. L. Sulzberger, "Can Asian riu Come Prom America?,"








of trade with Red China with a laeadMtr of the Japanese
Embassy staff in Washington, D. C«, the staff menber re*
peated that one obstacle to greater trade is that Red China
requires long-tern credit to pay for most purchases* This
is generally unacceptable to the Japanese.
The Chinese are using trade, or the promise of trade,
as the "carrot" on the end of a stick in the attempt to gain
their political, legal, diplomatic, as well as economic
goals from Japan*
Japan represents a critical makeweight in the balance
of power struggle between the United States euid Red China in
the Far East* Japan's contribution to the democracies falls
into three categories! military (Japanese potential and
strategic bases), economic and ideological. The latter is
by far the most significant*
Japan's experience and achievements in industrial
modernization are an eloquent testimony to the fact
that econ^aic progress can be achieved successfully
without the help of comnunist ideology or techniques
and they give the lie to communism's assertion that
the communist way is the best, if not the only, way
to rapidly develop Asian nations .^^
The political problem facing the Uhited States vis-^-
vis Japan is to support Japan in maintaining its healthy
economy and insuring that strategic military bases continue
to be available to American forces in the event the Japanese
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Self Defense Force remains so limited in size and scope as
to be relatively ineffective for the total defense of Japan.
Korea
At the conclusion of World War II, Korea was divided
into two sones at the 38tt) parallel to facilitate the 8ur~
render of the Japanese* Russians accepted the surrender to
the north and Americans in the south* This effectively set
the stage for the Korean War as two hostile camps developed
and the cold war became more intense* v^ompounding the
Korean problem is the fact that industry and mining are in
the northerri area while the southern area is basically
oriented towards agx icultioral pursuits-^thiis the areas are
complementary in nature*
On June 25, 1950, North Korean armies staged a sur-*
prise attack, and on June 27, 1950, American ground forces
were ordered to Korea* By October 1950, the tide of battle
had reversed, and tJnited Nations forces, primarily Americans,
approached the Yalu River* At this point, Chinese Communist
forces entered the fighting to bolster the sagging North
Koreans* The condensed version of the Korean War from Com->
munist China's point of view iss
25 June 1950* The Syngman Rhee government of South
Korea, directed by the U* S* aggressors, launches a^i
all<»out attack on the Korean O^nocratic Republic*^'
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2 October 1950. U* S« aggressive armies cross 38tb
parallel and drive toward China's frontier. 25
October 1950* Chinese People's Volunteers join with
Korean Peoples Amy to launch countcsr offensive
against U« S* Invading forces .^^
From October 1950 , until today, In spite of the armistice
signed on 27 July 1953, Korea represents a confrontation of
Aaerlcan and Communist Chinese povrer*
The current American political problem In Korea
largely evolves around (1) economic aid, (2) military sup^
port, and (3) the question of which one of the political
factions to back In an unstable political atmosphere* Of
the three basic facets of the Korean problem, (3) frequently
causes the government of the United States th& most c»mbar*
rassment*
In conclusion, contemporary Korea represents a staler-
mate; but the potential for a "brush fire" conflict Is ever
present for the United States due to the American consnltment
to provide military support to the Republic of Korea*
Southeast Asia
In many respects, Southeast Asia today represents the
classical patterns of political problems found In Asia as a
whole: social ferment, society In transition, virulent













problems created by overpopulation and CoBUBunism* There are
notable differences, however , which Riust be recognized as
these differences demand unique solutions to the probleas
they create. American diplomacy recognizes these differ-
39
ences fortunately and modifies its actions accordingly*
Among the differences to take into account are: (1)
Except for Thailand, the entire area was under European con^-
trol prior to World War II* Therefore, anti-white coloni-
alism is especially volatile* (2) Large segments of the
population consist of the so-called "Overseas Chinese" whose
loyalties have usually been to China; (3) Siirplus food-
producing regions make the area particularly attractive to
CoBsminist China; and (4) terrain and climate are ideally
suited to infiltraticm and guerrilla warfare*
Because of the vital importance of the Overseas
Chinese to the overall Southeast Asia politicail picture,
further explanation is required of their position* Due to
the '*two China" situation ( Nationalist: Communist ) , the Over-
seas Chinese picture is somewhat confused* However, Communist
China goes to great lengths propaganaizing that their loyalty
39Kenneth T* Young, "The United States and Southeast
Asia," Departm«it of state Bulletin , Vol. 33, pp. 843-845*
K. T. Young was Director of Philippine and Southeast Asian
Affair
,
U. 5* Department of State, at the time of this
address made before the American Council of Commerce and




is and should be to Peking as the true represcmtative of
40China. To counter Peking in this sphere, Chiang Kai-shek
Bakes the same plea* For example, in October, 1963, he
**call8 on sixteen million Overseas Chinese to prepare for
41
national recovery" with the direct implication the Over-
seas Chinese will play a major role against Peking in any
movement back to the mainland. In any event, the specific
responsibilities of the Overseas Chinese have been clearly
outlined.
CoBoiunist plans for the Overseas Chinese were an-
nounced in 1950 by Ho Hsiang-ning, chief Commissioner
of Overseas Chinese Affairs. He said their duty was,
(1) to form a united front with local leftists; (2)
to resist U. 3. and Allied influence; (3) to act as the
"outtix circle" of the vanguard of Communism.^2
In summation, Southeast Asia, as well as Communist
China, Formosa, Korea, and Japan, present the United States
with c<»Bplex political, economic auid military problems. With
Chapter I of this paper as background for the perplexijig
questions facing the U. S. Department of State vis-ii-vis the
Far East, Chapter II deals with specific major historical
events in which the Seventh Fleet made a significant mili-
tary contribution to the solution of those questions.
<40
A. Doak Darnett, Communist China and Asia (New York:
Harper Bros., 1960), pp. I'/i-ilo.
"^
^
Chinese News Service [English], Vol. NN-LXIII-43,
p. 3, New York , New York
•
^^Anthony Harrigan, "Sea Power: Bulwark Against
Chinese Conmunist Imperialism,'* U. ^. Naval Institute Pro-
ceedings (June 1960), p. 72. ""
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HISTORIC ROLE OP THE SEVENTH FUSET
I. THE OCCUPATION OP JAPAN
Japan ended World War II in total defeat, primarily
as the result of United States military action. Thus, at
the conclusion of hostilities, Japan could and did expect
the worse from the occupation forces* Yet, the preconceived
ideas of the Japanese regarding Americans just never materi-
alized*
Of even greater importance were the more constructive
aspects of the occupation, which contributed to its
success* The first was a psychological factor of high
value; the favorable reaction to the good conduct of
the occupation troops • • • • Japanese official propa-
ganda during most of the war had assiduously developed
the "Americans are beasts" theme* By the time hostili-
ties ended, the Japanese population was apparently
convinced that American Armed Forces were made up almost
exclusively of brutes, sadists, rapists • • • • However,
it soon became apparent that the vast majority of the
American troops were quite the reverse* For the most
part—exceptions were certainly not lacking—they
turned out to be almost ridiculously non-military in
bearing, kind, generous, helpful, understanding, and
eager to learn about Japan and its people*^
The United States encouraged Japan to rebuild its
industry and gave large amounts of aid to this end* The
Japanese recovery has been phenomenal, and the United States
John M, Maki, Government and Politics in Japan (New
Yorkt Frederick A* Praeger, 1962), p* 57*
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played the major role in supporting the recovery by not only
aid but in providing a major market for the finished prod-
ucts. Thus, the po8t-»war period with the great common
interests and close relationship with America has had a
tremendous social and cultural impact on Japan* The occupa-
tion may be considered as one of the world's greatest and
successful social engineering projects ever attempted* All
strata of society have been affected | and, albeit, Japanese
culture remains Asian, it has a strong western modification*
Among the "positive" results of the occupation was the
introduction of democracy to Japan* The Japanese have re-
sponded quickly to democracy* Though there are many aspects
of Japanese political life which are not in tune with our
ideas of democracy, they have assimilated the basic concepts
and are definitely pro-western in the ideological sense*
While the occupation of Japan was primarily an Army
role, the United States Navy made major contributions in the
logistic support areas and the Seventh Fleet, in particular,
made its impressions at those ports and naval bases set
aside for exclusive U* S* Naval use* The synthesis of Air
Force, Army, Navy, and Marine Corps forces was so complete
in the occupation, one cannot isolate a given branch of the
service to evaluate its specific value to the success of the
occupation* It is fair to say that the bulk of the occupa-
tion of Japan in military, economic and, to a large degree.
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psychological areas were a direct result of U* S« Amy
action and conduct; however, the U« S« Air Force and U« S*
Navy made significant contributions in critical areas.
II. KOREAN WAR
From the military point of view, the Korean War may
have started because of the Soviet Union's miscalculation of
American reaction to the invasicm of South Korea* This mis-
calculation was probably based on three important factors
i
first, on 12 January 1950, the United States Secretary of
State defined a defensive perimeter which did not include
South Korea or Formosa; second. United States military
forces had been slowly withdrawing from the mainland of Asia
and the United States probably would not fight over South
Korea; and third, the Navy-Air Force debate just completed
in Congress indicated American military strategy centering
on one kind of war-—global atomic* With Secretary of
Defense Louis A* Johnson reducing the Army and Navy, it be-
came an acceptable risk for the Soviet Union to initiate a
2limited war*
3The immediate response of the United States to the
North Korean attack brought into operation its military
2Malcolm W* Cagle and Frank A* Manson, "The Sea War
in Korea" (Annapolis: United States Naval Institute, 1957)
pp* 22-23*
»
''Footnote 12 of Chapter I refers*
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4forces against an overt power move of Conmunisia* For pur-
poses of this paper, the Importance of seapower principles
exhibited in the initial phases of this campaign cannot be
overstressed* Some of the major principles ares command of
the sea, mobility, flexibility of weapons, and ease of com-
mand and control* In addition, the fleets normally operate
in international waters, naval units provide good psycho-
logical tools, the fleet can provide a degree of ground
support by Fleet Marine Forces and, in a limited sense,
fleet operations can augment economic programs of the United
States* An expanded discussion of these principles is found
in Chapter V*
The above core concepts by no means are to be con-
strued or interpreted that seapower alone will implement
political decision when military forces are employed for
such purposes. Comments regarding the effect of seapower in
wars of past history are valid today for modern conflict*
The eminent authority on seapower, E* B* Potter, states
i
The inconclusive results of these wars (Christian-
Turkish W2u:s) underlined what had been demonstrated at
Lepanto (naval campaign, October 1571): That while
naval victories often make a decision possible, the
final decision is usually reached on land*
5
4The initial naval operations are covered fully in
Cagle and Manson, op * cit • , Chapter II*
5£* B* Potter and Fleet Admiral Chester W* Nimitz,
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Th« importance and recognition of seapower can be
readily demonstrated in the reactions of the U* S» Secretary
of State I Dean Acheson, in response to President Trionan's
request for advice on what course of icomediate action to
take in Korea. The Secretary of State *6 reply was to the
effect: Direct General MacArthur (then Supreme Commander
i
Allied Powers in Tokyo, Japan) to send all the ^sonunition he
can spare to Korea, evacuate Ainerican dependents by air and
ship, and deploy the Seventh Fleet to protect and neutralise
Formosa.
Further insight into the question of seapower as a
political-*military tool is made available by stat<»ments of
7General Douglas Mau:Arthur wherein he recommended!
1. Intensifying the economic blockade against China*
2. A naval blockade of the China coast*
3* Allowing air reconnaissance over Manchuria and
the China coast*
Immediately after the death of General MacArthur, a sensa^
tional interview with him that took place in 1954 was pub-
lished* In this interview, the General concisely demonstrated
his knowledge of national interest, logistics and seapower*
Regarding Korea, he said:
6Beverly Smith, "The White House Story of Why We Went
To War in Korea," Saturday Evening Post (November 10, 1951),
p* 78*
7General Douglas MacArthur, Address to U* S* Congress,
April 19, 1951, Congressional Record . Vol* 97, Part 3, p* 4123*
Jt












Russia? It makes me laugh when I recall the fears
of the Truman-Acheson--Marshall-Bradley general staff
group that Russia would contxnlt Its armies to a war In
China's behalf at the exid of an endless oiiQ-track rail-
road to a peninsular battleground that led only to the
sea* 8
One of the key words Is "peninsular** which allowed seapower
to operate In conjunction with land and land-based alrpower*
In the same article, MacArthur*s plan to protect Korea In-
volved the use of Marines, amphibious landings and Interest-
ingly enough, a radio-active cobalt barrier across northexn
Korea from the Yellow Sea to the Sea of Japan* The cobalt
barrier would have made Korea an Island and created a most
favorable geographic situation for defense by seapower some-
what analogous to that of Formosa*
In the opening phases of the Korean War, the United
States Navy's role was quickly appreciated* C^e of the first
problems was getting troops to Korea* HacArthur had four
divisions In Japan* "He must keep 2 divisions in Japan*
Any further troops needed will presumably have to be brought
9
across 7,000 miles of sea lanes from the United States •** A
second problem was that of air cover* South Korea had few
airfields and only two paved runways* Aircraft starting
o
General Douglas MacArthur in an Interview with
reporter Bob Consldine, Washington Post , April 8, 1964, p*
1*
"The News of the Week in Review,** The New York Times ,
July 2, 1950, p* IE, section 4*
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from Japan had liialted range and little time could be spent
over the battlefield.
Almost immediately, the Seventh Fleet aircraft car-
rxe. s took up the support of the ground forces* As early as
July 3, 1950 » the North Koreans were taken by surprise by an
attack on Fyong-yang well above the 38tt parallel by both
11propellor and Jet aircraft froa the U»S*S « Valley Forge .
Within three weeks after the conflict began, it was readily
apparent that the Seventh Fleet needed more ships to fulfill
its missions of: atw^cxxr^g the enemy, convoying troops to
Korea, maintaining a blockade of North Korea and patrolling
the Taiwan Straits as directed by the President of the
United States*
13The principle of mobility and its inherent advan*
tages was clearly demonstrated at Inchon, Korea* This was
the master stroke which after eighty<»two days the UN ground
forces were effectively relieved of the pressure on the Pusan
14perimeter* Through the use of bold amphibious landings to
outflank and cut logistic support, the United Nations forces
^
^Ibid *
Cagle and Hanson, op * cit * , pp* 37-.39j and The New
York Times . July 6, 1950, p. 8*
12New York Times « July 7, 1950, p. 5.
13Potter ana Nlmitze, 0P # cit * > p* 867*
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spearheaded by American Marine units broke the North Korean
15Peoples Army* General MacArthiur's daring and great gamble
at Inchon created a classic operation in the annals of mili-
tary history*
The Korean War conclusively settled the burning argu-
ments of 1948 and 1949 which centered around the aircraft
16
carrier vs« the B-36* For the period of the Korean War,
the aircraft carrier was indispensable to the UN forces* It
was quickly recognized that the United States had "over
concerntration on one kind of airpower (strategic atomic) at
17the expense of others (tactical and Navy)*** The Seventh
Fleet and the American Air Force units in combat quickly be-
came the verbal targets of Communist China* On August 24,
1950, Chou En-lai, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the
Central People's Government of the People's Republic of
China, sent a cable to the Secretary General of the United
Nations stating: '*The Seventh Fleet and contingents of the
15Fo£ i'^arine Corps participation in the Korean War
sees Lynn Montross and Nicholas A* Canzona, USMC, '*U. S*
Marine Operations in Korea," Headquarters U* S* Marine Corps,
Historical Branch G-3, 1957, Vols* 1-3 (Washington: Govern-
ment Printing Office, 1957}*
16
For a concise review of the issues at stake and the
general strategic, tactical, and technical postures of the
Navy and Air Force, s@ei Cagle and Malcolm, o£* cit«,
pp. 14-22*
17Hanson Baldwin, "U* S. Errors in Korea," The New
York Times . July 10, 1950, p* 7*
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U* S* Air Force • • • Care] openly encroaching on the terri-
18tory of China » etc*" By August 1951 » the Peking-sponsored
Hew China Hews Agency bitterly complained about air and
naval strikes in the Yalu regions* A report by Jen««in jih-
pao correspondent at Kaseong, Korea, August 5» 1951, states,
''without air and naval forces the ground forces would J>a
19driven in the sea.** On August 8, 1951 1 the saise source
reported, "XJ* S* Joint naval-air massacres of Korean ci-
20
vilians continues***
Space does not pemiit siore examples of the basic
principles of seapower which were present in the Korean War*
Needless to say, all principles were used with varying
degrees of success and usefulness* In Addition, the Korean
War «Q.erted the free world to the potential of Coamunisb
China* The fact that the Korean War had political objec-
tives as well as military obJcKitives was brought out early
21in the conflict* One of the effects on the American
people created by the Korean War was the awareness that war
BXid conflict was being modificKl rapidly from the traditional
^Mited Nations Dccimmnt 3/1715 . dated August 24,
1950} or U* 3* DepartaenT^f State Bulletin , Vol* 23, p* 607.
^
^Survey of the MainXaaad Press « #149, August 6-3,
1951, p* 5*
^Olbid *. #151, Augiist 10, 1951, p* 4.
2^John Foster Dulles, '*Korean Attack Opens New Chapter
in History,** Department of State Bulletin , Vol* 23, pp* 207-
210*
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concepts carried over from World Wax II. Among the concrete
evidences of this was President of the United States Harry
S. Truman *s summary relief of his area commander, General
Douglas MacArthur. By this action even the concept of vic-
tory was openly challenged. This was essentially a parallel
to President of the United States Woodrow Wilson's plea on
22
January 22, 1917, for a "peace without victory." With the
advent of atomic warfare, the question had arisen, "Can
there be a meaningful victory within the context of total
war?" The United States implied that the answer was—there
will be no escalation of the Korean War even though it may
deprive America of victory within the traditional concepts
of the word.
III. TACHEN EVACUATION
As a prelude to serious pressure by the Peking Govern-
ment on the United States over Formosa, the Communists
stepped up propaganda and, to a degree, military action in
ffiid-1954. U. S. naval elements assisted in the evacuation
from North Viet-Nam of approximately one hundred thousaind
evacuees and refugees. This evacuation inspired confidence
for the free peoples throughout Asia and gave eloquent
22Thomas A. Bailey, A Diplomatic History of the
American People (seventh edXtion; New York: AppTeton-










testimony that the United States Navy was ever available for
peaceful support as well as having a military mission in the
23
Par East* On July 22, 1954, two Communist Chinese fighter
aircraft shot down an unarmed British airliner thirty miles
24
south of Hainan Island in the South China Sea* Almost
immediately aircraft carriers of the Seventh Fleet were dis-
patched to the scene to "cover and protect" search and rescue
25
operations* On the 26tk of July, Seventh Fleet aircraft
promptly shot down two Communist Chinese aircraft which
enterctd the search area* This action was applauded by mem-
26bers of Congress back in Washington, 0* c*
The Seventh Fleet's action in implementing American
policy had a profound and sobering effect on Peking* The
Communist Chinese version of the loss of two of their air-
craft to American navy fighters was covered as follows
i
NCNA Peking, July 27, 1954.
09:25 Four U*S* naval fighter planes invaded China's
territorial air over Port Yulin*
10:05 Twelve fighters above Loh Huei of Hai Nan Island
shot down two Chinese patrol craft* Two fighters dived
23
"Exodus: Report on Voluntary Mass Flight to Freedom
Viet-Nam, 1954." Department of State Bulletin , Vol* 32,
October 1954, pp* 222-229*
24This and other attacks were covered by Henry Cabot
Lodge, Jr*, U* S* Representative to the United Nations, in
U« S*/U* H* Press release 1956, dated September 17, 19S4*
25Secretary of State John Fostcsr Dulles, Department
°^ ^tate Press Release 406, July 26, 1954* Earlier coverage
o? the news story. The New York Times. July 25, 1954, p* 1*
26The New York Times . July 27, 1954, p. 1*
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to strafe two Polish merchant and Chlnesa escort ves->
sels* The fighters fled when anti-aircraft guns were
fired in self defense* ^
7
The article continues and deplores the frequent violations
of Chinese territory by AsMrican forces*
By January 1955, six months after the Hainan Island
affair t Red China again started aggressive moves* The am-
phibious assault on Yikiangshen Island in the vicinity of the
Tachens was successful* President Eisenhower , taking cogni-
sance of the threat to Far Eastern peace » requested Congress
to grant him authority to use American military forces as he
saw fit in the iefense of Formosa^ the Pescadores and such
other areas as were considered necessary for the defense of
8Formosa* This action was to be taken within the framework
of the December 2, 1954, Kutual Defense Treaty between the
United States and the Republic of China* A treaty which by
29its Article X would ''remain in force indefinitely* ** Con-
gress subsequently granted the President the power he
requested with strcmg s\^>port* The issue was resolved by
Congressional Joint Resolution 159 » d4tk Congress, Ist Ses-
sion by the following votes House of Representatives on
27SuTYBV of the Mainland Press . No* 857, July 28, 1954,
^^essage from the President of the Xinited States o*
Eisenhower to Congress, January 24, 1955* House Document 76,
84tt Congress, 1st Session, or Department of State Bulletin,
Vol* 32, p. 213*
29
'For treaty text seet Department of State Bulletin t
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January 25, 1955 » vote in the affirmative 409-3 • Senate on
30
January 28, 1955, vote in the affirmative 85-3.
On January 18, 1955, Secretary of State Dulles made
statements to the effect that the Tachen Islands were not
essential to the defense of Formosa, and that the Seventh
Fleet would not take part in the fighting over these is-
31lands* Thus, the stage was set for evacuation of the
Tachens. The United States committed itself to the support
of the Republic of China's redeployment of forces cm
32February 5, 1955. On the next day, the Seventh Fleet,
33including five aircraft carriers, was ordered to the Tachens*
On February 7, 1955, Peking condemned the participation of
the Seventh Fleet and claimed the aircraft carriers had flown
2,224 sorties between January 24 and February 4, 1955, in
34
support of Chiang Kai-shek • The sasie day, a Department of
Defense aid (unidentified) stated the United States was ready
for "hot pursuit" of Conmunist forces if the evacuation were
35interfered with« By February 8, 195S, the situation could
^^Ibid., Vol, 32, p. 213.
^
^Ibld ., Vol, 32.1, pp. 191-192.
32Department of State Press Release No. 65 of Februciry
5, 1955.
33
The New York Times . February 6, 1955, p. 1.
34
Ibid .. February 7, 1955, p. 1«
35
Ibid .. February 8, 1955, p. 3.
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be summed up as ^he Chinese Communists are standing back a
respectful distance as the United States Seventh Fleet pro-
ceeds with the evacuation of the Tachen Islands. "^^ Thus,
the Seventh Fleet successfully evacuated 17,127 civilians
and 25,000 soldiers without incident under the ominous
threat of Red Chinese retaliatory action.
The Peking point of view was that the Conaaunist Party
of China had achieved victories of "real significance for
the final liberation of Taiwan and fully testified to the
fact that no force was strong enough to obstruct the Chinese
in their just struggle for the liberation of Taiwan and
other islands off the mainland. "^^
IV. QUEMOY' AND MATSU INCIDENT, AUGUST 1958
On the surface, this episode in history appears to
have been a probing action, or gamble, by Red China to take
over the Quemoy and Matsu Islands. It resulted in a failiire.
S\2b-surface factors were the internal situation in Communist
China, the aspirations of the "great leap forward," and
whole Sino-Soviet relationship—all of which contributed to
the Communist Chinese taking the initial overt moves. In
Ibid . « p. 1*
37Ho Kan-Chih, "A History of the Modem Chinese
Revolution," (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1959), pp.
592-593. [English language.]












the end these sub-surface reasons received, with lasting
effects, **fall-out" with its failure.
The timing of the Taiwan crisis was probably out of
the major considerations of i the western involvement in the
Kiddle East} the gross Chinese miscalculations of Soviet
38power (ICBM strength primarily); and the extent to which
the Soviets would support aggressive Red Chinese party moves
39towards Formosa* A secondary consideration was to create
support or at least non-resistance to the inaug\u:ati<Mi of
the commune system. An external threat or goal would help
build the badly needed cohesive forces for such a drastic
measure.
The Taiwan government interpretati^fi of the "Battle
of Taiwan Straits" lists the following as Communist China's
reasons for the actions (1) to test U. S. attitude on
defense of the islands and the strength of the Republic of
China to hold them; (2) to capture (Quemoy and Matsu) without
costly landing operations by means of sea and air blockade;
(3) create such an explosive international situation that the
pressure on the Republic of China would force it to withdraw;
38Alice Langley Hsieh, Communist China * s Strategy in
the Nuclear Sra (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc.,
15^2), pp. Qi::^.
^^Ibid.. pp. 120-130.
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and ^i^ to drive a wedge between Taiwan and the Uxilted
States.
Failure of the United States to support the Republic
of China at this time may have resulted in the Chinese Com*
nimists successfully challenging the principle that armed
force must not be \ised for aggression; demonstrating to
friend and foe alike that the United States was weak; creat-
ing a situation whereby the government of Taiwan may have
fallen, jeopardizing a part of the United States western
Pacific defense line; and gr.:atly weakening the will of free
41
nations all over the world to resist C(»imiuni8t pressure.
The role of the Seventh Fleet in any attempt of the
Communist Chinese to take over Formosa was early recognised*
In 1950 1 it was thought the Chinese Communists were handi-
capped by lack of a navy, and there was no evidence the
Russians would help. Intexrvention by the Seventh Fleet
would effectively stop any invasion unless such an invasion
42
was backed by Russia. Yet the reaction of the United
States to an invasion of Formosa by Commimist China still
appeared uncertain in 1954. When the Secretary of State was
40China Yearbook 1959-1960 (Taipei: China Publishing
Co., 1961), pp. 608-609. L£nglish language].
41
"The Strategy of Communist Advance,'* Qepartment of
State Press Release # No. 749, of December 12, 19^8.
p. 12.
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asked at a news conference if the United States would coun-
ter an attack on Formosa by action against the mainland,
Secretary Dulles replied, "not necessarily t retaliatory
action [would be] limited in scope with regard to the
43gravity of the offense." Three months later, Secretary
Dulles made the following statement regarding Formosa* The
defense of Formosa is "two distinct matters, first the
political decision as to what to defend, then the decision
as to how to defend • • • the political dcK:ision has been
44
taken."
The stage was set for intense pressure by the Chinese
Communists on the Taiwan straits area. As the pressure in-
creased in August 1956, one of the main responses of the
United states came in the form of the Seventh Fleet. As the
Seventh Fleet increas€»d the tempo of its operations, the
Chinese mainland press increased its verbal abuse of the
Fleet.
Peking. Aug. 24, 1958. U. S. Air provocations
• • • • shipping surveillance • • • air and surface
patrols and use of U. S. Navy bombers .^^
43John Foster Dulles, News Conference, Department of
State Press Release 6S6, December 1, 1954.
44John Foster Dulles, address to the nation over
television and radio, March 8, 1955, Department of State
Bulletin , Vol. 32, p. 459.
45Survey of the Mainland yress , op . cit. , No. 1841,
p. 51.
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Peking* Aug. 26, 1958. Seventh Fleet combined
naval exercise • • • raising tensions in Taiwan
Straits .^^
Peking. Sept. 7, 1958. Editorial Jen--rnln jih-pao .
600 million people mobiliae to crush the U. S. aggres-
sor.^*^ A bitter denunciation of the Seventh Fleet.
Hoping to bring Soviet influence into the contest « Pr^nier
Nikita S. Khrushchev sent a personal letter to President of
the United States Eisenhower. In this letter, he clearly
shows his appreciation of seapower by his condemnation and
derision of a siurface fleet capability. He draws a parallel
between the Seventh Fleet action in the Taiwan Straits and
the Sixth Fleet in Lebanon. He stated that the naval maneu-
vers and marines constitute air and naval blackmail. Further,
the surface fleet days are over and they serve no useful
purpose except to pay visits, courtesy calls, give salutes
and be a target for missiles. In addition, there can be no
48peace in the Far East until the Seventh Fleet is withdrawn*
The key to the entire situation was centered around
whether or not the offshore islands could be supplied. This,
in turn, was dependent upon the effectiveness of the Commu-
nist blockade. The Peking evaluation of the logistical
"^
^Ibid .. No. 1843, p. 25.
^
^Ibid .. No. 1851, p. 3.
48
PepartTnent of Stat# Bulletin , Vol. 39-1, pp. 499-
502. For President ^senh:>wer*s reply of September 12, 1958,
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situation for the islands se«as reasonable* It was esti-
mated that Chiemoy alone needed 700 tons of supplies per day,
49yet received only SO to 150 tons per day* As the tension
nounted, it became apparent that the Seventh Fleet would
have to provide more than moral support* The decision was
made that Seventh Fleet units would escort Chinese Nation-
alist vessels in the resupply of Quemoy in international
50
waters* The United States recognised and escorted to the
51three mile limit* This was a calculated risk on the part
of the Uhited States as previously, on September 4, 1958,
the Peking governmcoit had claimed a twelve-mile listLt for
52its territorial waters*
The Soviet reaction to the pressure on Quemoy and
Matsu was clearly enunciated in Pravda on October 6, 1958
t
But we have not interfered in and do not intend to
interfere in the civil war which the Chinese people
are waging against the Chiang Kai-shek clique*
The arrangement of their domestic affairs accord-
ing to their own discretion is the inalienable right
of every people* The intention to get back their
islands of Quemoy and Matsu and to free Taiwan is
the internal affair of the Chinese people* ^^
^Time MaqgLsine . September 29, 1958, p* 26*
50Department of State Press Release . No* 593, October
^
^Ibid *. No. 723, November 28, 1958*
52
Donald Zagoria, The Sino-Soviet Conflict (Princetons
Princeton University Press, 1962}, pp* 211-212*
^^Ibid*. p* 216*
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The Pravda statement made It quite clear to Peking
that they could expect no support from Moscow. This Soviet
attitude in all probability contributed to the deterioration
of Peking-Moscow amity* It appears a prediction of 1955 was
largely borne out by the end result of the crisis*
We cannot afford to allow the Communists to exer-
cise control of the sea routes around Quemoy* Not
even for 24 hours*
This matter of control and use of the sea approaches
is the crucial question in the battle for Quemoy* The
decision to attack will be largely guided by what the
Communists f€»el will be the action of the United States
on this aspect. 54
The American buildup of naval strength in one month
had 6 attack carriers and a 150-ship fleet on a war footing
in Formosan waters* The quick assembly of such massive
striking power through naval mobility may have been respon-
sible for averting a major conflict*
Thus,
• • * the U* S* Navy*s [through the Seventh Fleet]
demonstrated readiness to support America's Far Eastern
allies brought a new prestige to the United States in
that whole area, and a corresponding loss of face to Red
China. As a consequence, it undoubtedly improved the
bargaining position of the United States in its dealings
with Allies and neutralist countries alike .55
In conclusion, the Quemoy and Matsu incident represents
54Admiral Charles M* Cooke, USN (Ret.), "Quemoyt The
Immediate Threat to the Peace," Colliers (October 14, 1955),
p. 74.
55Potter and Nimitse, op . cit*, p* 881*
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a clear-cut political victory for the United States and a
serious setback for Peking. The ramifications of this de-
feat within the Sino-Soviet block take on greater signifi-
cance daily* This najor political victory was achieved
almost solely through the application of seapower in the
form of the Seventh Fleet*
V. TOE FORMOSAN QUESTION
The Formosan problem is one of the most controversial
issues facing the United States political planners*
The crisis in the Formosa Strait arises from the
fact that Nationalist China is c<»«nitted to holding
on to the offshore islands as well as to Formosa and
the Pescadores, and Communist China is committed to
acquiring them • • • • Talk of neutralising the off-
shore islands sounds reasonable to many non-Chinese,
but it is unacceptable to either Peking or Taiwan • * •
if Chiang approves the neutralization of the offshore
islands, he will have to renounce his goal of returning
to the mainland • » • and if Mao accepts such a program
he faces the prospect of never attaining his terri-
torial goals which it is believed include the taking
over of Formosa* 56
Regardless of the issues involved, the political deci-
sion to prevent Red China from taking over Formosa has been
made* The primary military tool to insure accomplishment of
this decision is the Seventh Fleet*
Taiwan, with its 11 million people, is more than
just an island* It is a country, more populous than
56Meal Stafford, "Tug of War of Two Chinas," Foreign
Policy Bulletin
. Vol* 38, No* 3 (October 15, 1958), p. 19.
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half of the members of the United Nations; and It Is
a symbol. Nowhere else In the Western Pacific Is the
value of the Seventh Fleet quilte so clear and final.
You can look at Taiwan and say with certainty: **Here
are 11 million people who would not belong to the Free
World now. If It were not for the existence of the
Seventh Fleet. "57
One particularly pessimistic view concerning Aiaerlcan
Formosan policy states
i
The fact Is that when the American Government In
1950 sent the Seventh Fleet to Far Eastern waters
to guarantee Formosa against attack by the Communists,
who had jiist gained control of the mainland, we gave
a hostage that cannot be redeemed except at a cost
certainly disastrous and perhaps fatal .58
American policy has not always supported the Nation-
alist cause on Formosa. In early 1950, the United States
had completely abandoned Chiang Kai-shek to the extent that
the U. S» Department of State expected the fall of Formosa to
59the Chinese Communists In the near future. Today, although
the United States Is comaltted to help defend Formosa,
America would not, and In fact could not, oppose a general
60desire for unification with Communist China.
57William H. Hessler, **&lue Water Around Red China,"
ii»£* Naval Institute Proceedings (February 1963), p. 38.
Nathaniel Peffer, **Should Our Formosan Policy Be
Changed ?** Foreign Policy Bulletin . Vol. 34, No. 5 (November
15, 1954), p. 38.
59
G. F. Hudson, "The Two Chinas," Current History ,
July 1956, p. 2.
60Michael Lindsay, "A New China Policy: Difficulties
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The two primary military supporting elasicmts to
Formosa are the Seventh Fleet and units of the United states
Air Force* The role of the U. S« Air Force is to a large
degree a psychological threat of atomic warfare and in a
lesser capacity it provides training and aid to the Nation-
alist Air Force. The Seventh Fleet provides Taiwan Straits
patrol, and a major capacity for retaliation in the event of
overt aggression on the part of Communist China in both
atomic and conventional air strikes for the full range of
the China coast. In addition, it also douOi^les in training
with the Nationalist forces. The extent of the military
activity can be seen from the fact that during the period
January 1961 to March 1962 the Peking government issued its
131st to 193rd warning to the United States over American
"military intrusions." Involved were twenty-'Six warships
including submarines-«-and the remainder of the violations
were aircraft "violating" Kwangtung or Fukien Provinces.
One view of the Seventh Fleet is that it was the only
way Chiang Kai-shek could be supported. A pure facade is to
say it is to keep the Nationalists from returning to the
62
mainland. yet, a casual sampling of Nationalist Chinese
61Communist China Year Book (Hong Kongt China Re-
search Associates, 1963), pp. 575-576. Extracts from the
Peking Review No. 4, January 26, 1962.
62
Cl?iude A. Buss, "The Arc of Crisis," (Garden City:
Ooubleday and Co., 1961), pp. 65-66.
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news media indicate the extent of the raids conducted against
the mainland* T'^atlonalist claims arex
From March 1962 to October 1963 - 1,785 guerrilla
agents to the mainland*
63From June to October 1963*^32 Commando raids*
October 1963 - 21 new Commando raids on the main-
land .64 In 1963 the Chinese Communists have admitted
to 14 anti-Communist guerrilla groups in Kwangtung
Province* 65
If the Nationalists* claims are true, it appears the Seventh
fleet acts as a barrier to Communist China's aims vis-Jl-vis
Formosa and as a **one way filter" to agents and raiders from
Taiwan*
The Seventh Fleet's activities as a training unit for
the Nationalists is exploited fully* Among recent exercises
were operations "Big Dipper'* and '*Blue Star**' The month-
long Sino-American amphibious exercise with the Seventh
Fleet in February 1964, named "Operation Back Pack," con-
sisted of fully integrated naval and marine units of both
66Nationalist and Seventh Fleet forces*
63Chinese News Service [New York , Mew York J , Vol
*
MN-LXIII-48, November 26, 19^3, p* 4*
Free China Review (Taipei, Taiwan), Vol* XIII,
No* 10, p* 81, October 1963* [English language]*
^
^Free China Weekly [New York, New York], Vol. NN-
UCrv-l, January 7, 1^64, p* 4*
^^Ibid., Vol. NN-LXIV-7, February 18, 1964, p* 4.
'«<«DoD %#Mi is: ?( %v
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ra^
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It is readily appar^it that the United States Is
fully committed to the support of Chiang Kai-shek and the
Nationalist governL r^nt on Formosa for the ismediate future*
Of all the arguunents for our present policy, aanong the
strongest logic presented ist
What acually aiaJces Taiwan important is that it
provides a demonstration under Chinese conditions
that reformist policies can be far more effective
than Communist policies in improving the conditions
of the masses*^'
Perhaps our policies regarding Formosa and Commimist China
would be more acceptable to our allies in the free world by
modifying our present posture to conform more closely to the
actuality of the situation.
Only when we start to move off dead center in
East Asia, beginning with the creation and imple-
mentation of imaginative policies based on the
reality of two Chinas, will we start to exert a
constructive influence on the shape of events to
corae*^^
In summation, the political issues surrounding the
Formosan question are many and can be arguc^i with forceful-
ness{ however, the decision to support Nationalist China was
made, the Seventh Fleet was selected as the primary military
tool to implement the decision, and it has successfully met
the Chinese Cc^B»ii4nist pressiures.
67
Idndsay, op » cit
• , p« 61.
€8Chester Bowles, "The 'China Problem* Reconsidered,"
Foreign Affairs , April 1960, p* 486
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SEATO was forged by Secreteury of State Dulles in the
period when American defense posture relied on "nassive
retaliation*" The unilateral burden was placed squarely on
the United States, and the fact that no American ground
forces were to be used was made clear to Congress* (^
March 8, 1955, Secretary of State John F* Dulles conducted a
radio-television report to the nation in which he saids
SEATO* 8 ability to repel attack is based on the
retaliatory power of mobile American air and sea
forces plus native armed forces*'^
In Southeast Asia the problem is not to counter the
overt power moves of aggressor nations but rather the ero-
sion by subversion and indirect aggression* This is recog-
nized by Article IV of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense
71Treaty* In view of the nature of the military problem in
ttMi area and that the United states is to provide no ground
troops, many Southeast Asian nations can question the value
of SSATO*
The alliance has produced sone military advantage* It
69Norman A. Graebner, Cold War Diplomacy 1945-1960
(Princeton: Nostrand, Inc*, 1962), pp. 94-9"^.
70Department of State Press Release, No* 131, March
8, 1955.
71For complete treaty text, see Department of State





















has nade possible joint planning and training, exchange of
Intelligence, standardization of weapons, and military doc-
72trine, and Improvement of base facilities. As early as
the third year of Its existence, 5EAT0 exercises Involved
Seventh Fleet participation. In 1958, a report was made
that of the five major military exercises completed, three
73involved sea forces* These exercises, cf course, expand
In scope and complexity as experience dictates and they have
been of a continuing nature.
The Seventh Fleet makes a unique contribution to the
SCATO nations* sense of security* By Its mobility, It can
be present In tine of crisis and. In addition, It frequently
makes good-will visits to the area. This Is tangible ac-
knowledgmcmt to the peoples of the SEATO countries that the
United States Is ready to uphold Its pletdge to support their
Independence. Due to this mobility, the Seventh Fleet fre-
quently Is under verbal attack by the Commmlsts* Chinese
C<»imunl8t Chou Sn-lal said the American Navy "threatens the
74peace of southeast Asia." Jen-mln 1 Ih-pao demands the
75
"U. S. Navy to get out of Singapore"! and the Peking Review
72A. Doak Barnett, Communist China and Asia (New York:
Random House, 1960), p. IS*?!
73
Department of State Bulletin , Vol. 38.1, pp. 509-516,
74Survey of the Mainland Press, op . clt
.
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March 2, 1962, complains that the Uhited States is get-
ig bolder and more unscrupulous In their intervention and
jression in South Viet-Nara with "U. S« warships on opera-
>nal duty day and night along the coast*"
In suzamation, from the practical military problem
•int of view, it is reSLSonable to say:
In any realistic sense • • • S£ATO*s strength con-
sists almost wholely of what is injected by the five
outside powers, the Uhited States, Britain, France,
Australia, and New Zealand,''
y political agreements of 3SAT0, the Seventh Fleet was
iven added stature and recsponsibility* Considering the
strength of the so-called "outside powers" previously men-
tioned, the lion's share of the responsJJdility would evolve
to the Seventh Fleet as the U. S* Air Force has few support
bases to acconunodate extensive operational conmitraents for a
conventional war in behalf of the SEATO nations*
76Communist China Yearbook
. 1962, 0£* cit *, p. 486*
77Hamilton Fish Armstrong, "Thoughts Along the China
Border; Will Neutrality Be Enough?," Foreign Affairs
(January 1960), p* 245*
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THE CHANGING NATURE OP P0WE31 VIS-X-VIS
THE SEVENTH FLEET
I. SEVENTH FLEET CAPABILITY AS
A POLITICAL-MILITARY TOOL
Technology in the atomic age has completely revised
thinking regarding an all-out total national war effort
such
as we exerted in World War II. Because of today's
weapons,
"War has become less useful as a policy; due to heavy
over-
tones and threat of 'total war'"i the political
elements
have developed greater control over the military
forces; war
will take greater emphasis in roles of insurgency
and counter-
insurgency (which may or may not act as wars "by proxy"
for
the great powers); and mutually agreed sanctuaries
will be
recognized by the combatants through their patterns of
action in the attempt to prevent escalation and to
localise
1
the conflict—if the powers involved fear "total war."
It is important to define clearly power at this point.
"Power" as used here is "power" in the narrow sense—
military
power of a coercive nature. Other forma of power are:
^captain E. .\mme, USN (Ret.). "The Changing Nature of




















economic power, dipX<»natlc power, the power to generate con-
sensus on the world scene, etc«
In spite of the awesome force of nuclear weapcms,
conflict and instability confront us everywhere.
The threat of nuclear war did not stop small wars,
border conflicts and peripheral struggles* An over-
dependence upon nuclear deterrence hampered oiir
diplomacy, reduces flexibility, places too much mili-
tary effort on a strategy we would be most reluctant
to imploBMnt* The nuclear age has increased the
demand for variety and versatility—we must have a
flexible strategy, freedom of choice, alternative of
action • • • .^
The truth of this statement can be substantiated by reference
to Table I, infra , p* 62*
From the abov^, it is clear that man*s reason and
morality are slowly catching up with his scientific ability
to control the forces of nature. Total war has become out-
moded because in the nuclear age there can be no meaningful
victory. Restraint is essential and the selection of mili-
tary means is a political decision which is properly the
responsibility of political leaders—not the military. This
latter concept was forcefully imposed during the Korean War
by the summary relief of General Douglas MacArthur from com-
sumd of the prosecution of the war.
Hanson Baldwin, New York Times Maqasine . August 18,
1957. Also see, "The Interrelationship of kilitary Power
and Foreign Policy," Department of State Bulletin , Vol. 31,
August 1954, pp. 291-294.
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LZKITSO WMtS Airi> CR2S£S SXNCE WORLD MAR XI*
DATE
MMMBWIIMHia
XHCIOSN? miKB&ii orPARTICIPANTS DIRECTLYIHVOLVEO
1945<-47 Ind<»i«slan War 280,000 No
194S«'49 Chiiui«4i Civil War 3 ,200,000 Yes
1945--S4 MatXayan war 185,000 Yes
X94S*S4 War in Indochina 835,000 Yes
1945-? Berlin Criaaa ummown Yes
1946-49 Graale Civil War 236,000 Yes
1947-49 icaahttir Dispute 153,000 No
1948-49 Arab-Israeli War 205,000 No
19$0-S3 Korean War 2 ,149,000 Yes
1954 Guatesalan Revolt 14,000 Yes
1955 Argentine Revolt 56,000 No
1955-59 Revolt on Cyprus IMlcnown No
1956 Invasion of Sgypt «a4
Sues 217,000 No
1956 Hungarian Revolt 120,000 Yes
1956-59 Cuban Revolution 50,000 Suspected
1956-59 Revolt in Tibet unknown Yes
1956-62 Algerian War 520,000 No
1957 Insurrection in Kuscst/
OBian 3,000 No
195t Lebanon-Jordan-Xraq
Crisis 35,000 (£St,) No
195d Queney/Taiwan Strait
Crisis 395,000 Yes
1959-? Querrilla Warfare in Cuba tmicnown Yes
1959-
?
Sino-Xndian Border i>ispute Unknown Yes
1959-? Ouerrilla War in Laos Iftiknown Yes
I960-? Congo Crisis 30,000 (Est*) Yes
1960-7 Guerrilla War in South
Vietnsn 270,000 (Sst.) Yes
1961 Revolt in Angola 20,000 (Est*) No
1961 Doninicsn Republic Crisis 20,000 (Sst») No
1961 Crisis in Kuwait 12,000 (Est.) No
1961 Invasion of Soa 15,000 (Est.) No
1962-;r War in west New Quinea Saiall No
1962- Revolt in Yen«ft unknown unkno%m
1962 Quarantine of Cu3t>a Iftkknown Yesm
^CDR Robert Hm Gortiley, USN, **Linitod War and the
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What relevance then does the Seventh Fleet have as a
general military tool today?
First is deterrence* The Seventh Fleet represents
iiomediate nuclear and conventional strike capability which
augments the Strategic Air Command (SAC) and Polaris weapons
systems* This is most important as the Seventh Fleet con-
fronts the world's most dynamic revisionist power-^-Communist
China*
Second is control of the sea* Logistic support of
any land or sea military action is critically dependent upon
unfettered lines of communication* Control of the sea in-
sures our unrestricted use of the sea to implement political
decision, while at the same time denying that privilege to
an enemy*
Third, the Marine Corps element of the Seventh Fleet
provides immediate response combined with conventional
weapons of naval air power to establish beachheads or sup-
port local governments*
Fourth is mobility* The complete range of target
complexes in Asia are a matter of a few hours steaming to
bring the full and sustained power of the Seventh Fleet to
bear*
Fifth, flexibility* One Forrestal-class carrier has
the atomic weapon striking power equivalent to all conven-
tional ordnance expended by all combatants during the entire
e»






















World War II period and, at the saroe time, as an independent
striking unit retains the capability to maintain normal sus-
tained conventional air strikes on assigned station for a
three-day period without replenishment*^
In the post-World War II period, the validity of each
of the capabilities has been challenged with the exception
of the Seventh Fleet's contribution in a total war situation.
One can assxime, however, this latter capability, though not
challenged, has given pause to potential aggressors in the
Far Cast to limit their ambitions*
A further comment on general seapower considerations
was given by Admiral Radford as a primer on naval power:
Historically seapower is the most mobile and there-
fore the most economical of military force* For 3,000
years or more, navies fought on the two dimensional
ocean surface* The carrier-based plane gave navies the
third dimension of the air* It has given them a sort
of fourth dimension (1950)—a sweep of 500 miles [today
(1964) over 1,200 miles] or more from any coast*
Nearly all economic and political power centers in the
world lie within 500 miles of deep water *^
In conclusion, with regard to the current world
political milieu and fleet capability, two classical stories
involving the Sixth Fleet (the Mediterranean counterpart of
the Seventh Fleet) are told* The principles involved in
U-S.S. INDEPENDENCE (CVA-62) capability briefing lec-
ture (unclassified) given visiting dignitaries and members of
the press, 1961*
4From an article about Admiral Radford, USN, Time
Magazine (September 11, 1950), p* 39*
A ^At iioiiAia .tA X»iiolin*Tao9 b^olai
ion It: ,Y^-^<'^'^*^<1A^ ^uvj^aX eld^ ,.i«Yvwoii ,tMHi««A iii>9 aoO
• Knolildfls xfcaili ixjRlJ " -^aAl ia^
ftJK>li««*bicno9 ^MWoqAftS Ia-k*ii*P no ifwanoD :i»/(iai/i A
000, £ lo'l ••310^ yijs^illin lo XaolAOOO^a i«^
imooXma»mlb o\ ' no iripuolt aeiv&n ^auois ao eoaeY
Y J a»XJLin u ir. rio qaawa B^-iOd^i) nolanemx^
•ffi ni iswoq XBDii. XX« y*!^^'
'^
.-i^iAw q«ftb %• B«Xx« Cud aliiilw ftXX bl
a»x^o;?e xij^x&cfii. wXXidAqAr jssj. >jxj.^i Xa^Xjj.xu4
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acJT ,'/EU fbTO\bs.P Xs^isifcA iuods rrlDi^-ir iie nroi*?
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these stories apply equally well to the Seventh Fleet* The
first concerns the Suez Crisis of 1956 wherein the Sixth
Fleet was alerted to intervene and restore stability in the
area if necessary. Upon receipt of rat^ r detailed butt at
the sane time, axnbiguous orders due to the extremely tender
situation involving our HATO allies, Admiral "Cat** Brown,
Commander, Sixth Fleet, moved into the trouble zone almost
iaosediately, and with complete candor reported to the
Pentagon words to the effect, "the Sixth Fleet is ready for
any contingency-—whose side are we on?**
The second story regards capability and the Lebanese
crisis* As it was told. President Eisenhower asked senior
military advisers what could be expected of each of the
services in response to the crisis. The Chief of Staff for
the Air Force gave an estimate of a week or so to deploy a
tactical fighter squadron with all its logistical support
from Germany, and the Army Chief of Staff said essentially
the same thing to move a battalion or some other unit of
comparable sise. When Admiral Arl*$lgh Burke, Chief of Naval
Operations, was asked what the Navy could do, he replied.
5This incident received wide publicity among officers
and men of the Sixth Fleet and was generally accepted as
true at the time.
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"Nothing—-we are already there." He was—and as history has
6
proven, the situation was well in hand.
The points of the two stories ares the pattern of
world political events presents a confused picture; because
of seapower, the striking fleets (both :<th and Seventh)
have logistic support, mobility in immediate response, flexi-
bility in choice of weapons systems (be it a Marine with a
rifle or an aircraft with a nuclear weapon), and a point
which has not been mentioned but is vital today, an immedi-
ate communication link with political control centers for
guidance and instruction.
Thiis, the principles upon which the Seventh Fleet con-
stitute a useful military tool have not been altered—but
the form and application of the Seventh Fleet's capability
has undergone tremendous technological and tactical revision.
^Mentioned in a discussion of seapower principles by
Captain Harvey P. Lanham, USN, who was Admiral Burke's




PSYCHOLOGICAI* AND ECCSIOKXC FACTORS-**
PRXNdS monsFXTs
Xm THREAT AMD COMFIDEI. . >
!hi« to th« chttngiiig nature of power, 9r«at«jr MBphasis
Is staadlly being pXacod on psychological prassuraa to
achiave political ands* Haviaa have always bean cwntral
actors in such power plays
• • • because of the high nobility of navies, which
are able to bring the flag and power of a nation to
the four corners of the globe, and because of the
great impK^MBlyf^gimBB of their appearance, naval
desonstrations have in the past been a favorite ii^
struBwnt of the policy of prestige* -^
The U* S« QovemoMnt has been moving steadily
toward a heightenckl awareness of the importance of
political warfare in relation to the armed forces*
As far back as 1953, the President's Committee on
International Information Activities said, "In
reality, there is a psychological aspect or implies^
tion to every diplomatic, economic or military
policy and action * • « •
For the first time in its history, the United
States must develop and maintain a capability for
waging political warfare on a grand scale* It is
not Plough to have fleet units off the African
coast* The people of every nation with a shore*
line * • • miust know about the U* S* fleet* They
must not be allowed to forget its presence* l^iere*
fore, such a fleet would have as its prisuury task,
Hans J* Morganthau,
.^Uy^sa Am^aaMa^^ (third
yorks Knopf, 19^0), p* 73*edition} New Y
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not the sinking of enemy ships, but rather the in-
fluencing of opinions, attitudes, and political
behavior of uncommitted peoples in such ways as to
^
advance the high national aims of the Uhited States*^
In addition to pure military posture, naval units in
friendly visits to ports of call provide contacts in the
"People to People" program initiated by President Eisenhower*
The importance of this vital function is frequently over*
looked because it is lost in the fanfare accorded dignitaries
and the press coverage given to the international implica-
tions of such visits* Fortunately, key people in this
program are well aware of the humble contacts made by the
enlisted pcursonnel*
Because the American whom an Asian is most likely
to meet these days is in uniform, Stiimp [Admiral
Stximp, then Commander-in-Chief Pacific J insists that
all servicemen function in a dual capacity: they
must be soldiers and sailors, and they must be shirt-
sleeve diplomats • • • • To overcome this basic dis-
trust [of all white people] the Admiral urges his men
to avoid "tight white" colonies and to make friends
with the people they have come to help*
3
The message of the importance of this aspect of the
united States Navy*s mission has been fairly well covered by
4popular news media* Life Maqasine . December 23, 1957, in
^Anthony Harrigan, "Sea Power: Bulwark Against Chinese
Commxmist Imperialism," U* S* Naval Institute Proceedings
(June 1960), p* 28* ""
""
3Fred Sparks, "Admiral Stump Shows the Flag—And The
Heart," Readers Digest (December 1955), p* 99*
4Franc Shor, "Good Will Ambassadors of the U* S* Navy
Win Friends in the Far East," The National Geographic Maga-
zine . September 1959, pp* 283-735".
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an articltt entitled, "Keeper of the Peace in the Pacific**
refers to the Seventh Fleet aui "doubling in diploaiacy and
deterrence**' In the June 22, 1962, issue of Life an article
on the "Mighty New Navy of the U« S* A*,** quotes Admiral
David L« McDonald, USN (then Connander, Sixth Fleet) that
**we all have two jobs'* in reference to our military and
**ambassadorial functions.'*
One final quote regarding this area of conscious
effort on the part of the Navy to build confidence in our
allies that the united States will honor its commitments is
made by Demaree Bess and refers to the Sixth Fleet in the
Mediterranean. The principles involved apply equally well
to the Seventh Fleet in the Far Sast*
But although our Navy has employed the most powerful
unit in the Mediterranean since September, 1946, it is
true that this task force has been used over here
chiefly as an instrument of diplomacy. The American
people are intimately involved today in the affairs of
Gxi,3ce, Turkey • • • [etc.], and our Navy is the
visible symbol of our participation .^
In the area of threat as a psychological tool, no
clearer case can be made than that of the offshore islands
and Formosa. It is generally conceded that if it were not
for the Seventh Fleet and the threat it poses for Peking,
Formosa would long ago have fallen into the Communist orbit.
5Demaree Bess, **Our Navy in Striped Pants,** Saturday
Evening Post (May 14, 1948), p. 30.
*»H ^»w no j'-ioiia
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Tha second psychological aspect regarding Formosa is:
Not only must we remain steadfast in o\ur support
of Free China, but we mast also continue our success-
ful policy of helping Free China to defend its off-
shore island territories • These islands have the
same psychological importance for fret^ ^hinese every-
where that Berlin has for free Germans.^
There can be no doubt that the threat of retaliation
by the Seventh Fleet, in conjunction with Uhited States air*
power has seriously hampered Communist China's aggressive
intentions* Deterrence is in itself largely a psychological
attitiade* The Chinese Communist Party is quick to label
American forces and strength as that of a "paper tiger,"
however, they consistently refuse to accept the risk of nu-
7
clear war being waged against them.
In addition, there are other psychological advantages
which are generally overlooked when discussing the Seventh
Fleet operations. A few of these ares
1. The Navy's deterrent stand is non-provocative.
Since cxurrent naval deployments on a global scale
have been maintained for many years, their presence
in close proximity to threatened areas is now
accepted as routine. There is n need to fear the
danger of worsening an already bad situation by
Anthony Bouscaran, "The Nature of War We Are In,"
U. S^. Naval Institute Proceedings (Octobcu: 1961), p. 35.
7Alice Langley Hsieh, Communist China's Strategy in
the Nuclear Era (Englewood Cliffs: Prent;ice Kail, Inc.
,
1962). A comprehensive and well-documented work which
describes in detail the evolution of Communist China's






















having to re-deploy* We auce relieved of the hazard
of precipitating an enemy attack by the hasty move-
ment of forces from the United States to the scene
of possible trouble*^
2* We can bolster the local will to resist by stand-
ing by, ready, in periods of tension, yet without
imposing ourselves physically on a troubled populace.
3« Our prompt entry into any state bordering the
sea cannot be preventeKi by the refusal of a nervous
or unsympathetic third nation to grant us transit
rights, or to permit our use of already established
bases.^
4* Seapower reduces the need for overseas bases
which most foreign people regard as constituting an invita-
tion to attack on their country.
5. Naval forces at sea comprise pure military targets
which relieve civilian tensions as they are out of the zone
of danger generated by such forces.
The greatest limitation on the '^show the flag" opera-
tions in that it usually is confined to coastal water areas.
This has been overcome if the need is deemed urgent enough
to have aircraft carriers launch mass "overflights'' to bring
the desired psychological results inland. A specific case
in point was the complete coverage of Italy by naval aircraft
at low level a matter of hours before the official occupation
gHarvey 3. Seim, Captain, USN, "Naval Power and Oeter-
r«Ace," U.^. Maval Institute Proceedings (December 1961),
p« 68.
Stewart B. Barber, "Seapower and American Survival,"
U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings (March 1961), p. 60.
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ended* A parallel in the Far Sast wass
The Fleet's peacetime mission had largely been that
of showing the flag aroimd the Orient; in fact the
planes of Air Group Five had flown parade over Inchon
and Seoul on 5 April [1950] from the decks of the
Valley Forge • A few days later they appeared over
HongKongTiOr
In summation, naval operations, to show strength for
either intimidation of a potential enemy or to inspire con-
fidence in allies, have unique advantages over other forms
of military demonstrations. One of the best contemporary
illustrations of this is the Seventh Fleet off Formosa*
Mass psychological measurement is difficult, and the only
valid criteria is results* Using this as the guideline, it
is rather clear that in areas of "threat and confidence" the
Seventh Fleet has achieved at least a modest degree of sue*
cess*
II. ECONC»!IC CONSIDERATIONS
It is not the purpose of this paper to discuss the
cost to the united States of maintaining the Seventh Fleet
in Far Eastern waters* One can rest assured that though the
cost is tremendous, it is still an econ<»nically sound instru-
ment of policy* The political conflict in Congress over
Malcolm w* Cagle and Frank A* Hanson, The Sea War
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appropriations and the inter-servica rivalry in tha Pentagon
have created exhaustive studies on all military operations,
and the fact that the Seventh Fleet maintains its mission is
prima facie evidence that it is economically feasible as a
political'-Bilitery tool in the Far Sast*
The economic facts to be considered fall into two
categories* First is the contribution the Seventh Fleet
makes to foreign economies* In general, this contribution
is made in five areas, two of which are generally fixed, and
three which constitute variables* The two fixed items repre-
sent major United States naval bases, primarily in Japan and
the Philippines; and naval shipyards which do extensive
repairs for the United States->-gene»rally found in Japan*
These two fixed sources of "hard currency" producing en-
deavors that give local support to the Seventh Fleet can be
considered as major economic props to their national
economies* These, in turn, bolster the overall gross
national product* A typical example is the main Uhited
States naval base at Yokosuka, Japan* By September 1959,
the United States had "spent about S15,000,000 on repairs
and improvements*" These bases and shipyards not only
helped the local economies but saved American taxpayers
money* Not counting transit costs and time to return to the
Shor, o£* cit*, p* 314*
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west coast of the Uhlted States, direct savings on shipyard
12
work done in Japan ran from 65 per cent to 60 per cent*
Domestic American politics » in the form of west coast Con-
gressmen, representing shipyards, have curtailed to a
degree the savings to American taxpayers by restricting the
amount and nature of work which can he performed at advance
bases
•
The variables are derived from port of call visits
and landing fees. It does not take much imagination to
realize the economic impact on a local community when four
thousand young men who have been out to sea for two weeks
suddenly arrive* As a general rule (using Hong Kong as an
example) the Naval International Balance of Payments Section
bases its per capita expenditure of United States dollars as:
the number of men granted liberty during an average in-port
period times $20*00*
This is coupled with the fact that the average Seventh
Fleet sailor receives more pay in one month than the average
native of the area earns in one year* Japan, of course,
falls into a different categoxry in this respect, but it is




Mr. Irvin Cohen, Navy Comptroller Office, Inter-
national Balance of Payments Section, Washington, 0* C*
From a conversation on April 17, 1964*
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and crew aboard one Forrestal-<:lass attack carrier amounts
14
to $6 14, 000 •00. Another Important feature is that of
being able to select ports of call and in this way the
economic ccHitribution to an indigenous economy can be given
political discrimination iinder a given situation* This may
not represent a large contribution to those infrequent ports
of call, but those areas which are visited regularly, such
as Hong Kong, enjoy direct economic support by the Uhited
States in this manner*
The second category to be reviewed is the current
gold flow crisis* The Seventh Fleet offers unique advan*
tages in this respect as for all practical purposes and
political considerations there is complete control of "hard
currency** exchange* Unlike the U* S* Air Force and the U* S*
Army, which require bases on foreign territories in the Far
East, the Navy can: evacuate the bases sind shipyards over-
seas and stay at sea without making ports of call and paying
landing fees* This would be inconvenient, costly, hard on
morale, and deny the Navy its good will functions~«but it
could be done* For example, 98 per cent of all supply for
the Seventh Fleet in the Taiwan Straits is supplied by sea
15
only* As long as the United States maintains control of
14Lieutenant George Meade, USH (SC), Pentagon, Nav-
Compt Code NCAS 214, 18 August 1963.
15Shor, OP * cit*, p* 311*
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the sea, full logistic support of the SeYenth Fleet can be
maintained directly tr<mi Hawaii with at-sea replenishment.
To conclude the discussion of economic factors; the
Seventh Fleet as a political-military tool can be varied in
missions from a discriminating contributor to foreign econo-
mies or, as one would turn off a valve, to complete isola-
tion, thus contributing to the solution of the gold flow
problem. In either case, it can perform its military func-
tion, but in the latter example the capacity to encourage
friendly relations with foreign allies and '^show the flag**
to bolster confidence would be impaired*
>r
CHAPTER V
THE SEVBMTJ! FLEET I IS IT THE CORRECT POLITICAL
MILITARY FORCE FOR THE ASIAN QUESTION?
I. THE POLITICAL ADVANTAGES IN THE
USE OF NAVAL SEAPOWER
The political decision maker of today is faced with a
myriad of factors and overspill effects from any decision
made in the field of international relations. It is very
improbable that any action will meet the aatisfaction of all
concerned* The problem resolves itself to one of maximizing
what advantages accrue from a given situation and minimizing
the inherent disadvantages involved.
The discussion of the advant^^^ j in the use of naval
power is largely an expansion of the previouslynnentioned
factors of capability as viewed by a political decision
maker. These advantages aret
1* Mobility . Immediate response and ability to
shift concentrated power over 70 per cent of the earth's
surface. In the case of the Seventh Fleet, the full range
of eastern Asia and Indonesia can be covered. If desired,
1
The relationship of the three-mile limit of terri-
torial seas to the U. 3. Navy*s mobility capability is dis-
cussed by U. S* Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral A. Burke,
USN in the Department of State Bulletin , Vol. 42.1, p. 2S9.
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nobility enhances surpriso* In concrete terms, the distance
from Southern Koxea to Malaya is about 2,400 nautical miles*
Assuming the fleet could get underway immediately, weather
conditions were favorable to a high speed of advance and a
direct route is available, the optimum time for transit is
2
about five days. This "elapse" tijae is not realistic, how«>
ever, if the Seventh Fleet is required to maintain an air~
borne combat patrol of fighters on a twenty-four hour basis*
If this condition exists, the carriers must, of necessity,
turn into the wind to launch and recover aircraft* If the
wind is from the direction of intended fleet movement, no
time is lost) if the wind is one hundred eighty degrees from
intended directicai of travel, the transit time would be in-
creased by at least 25 per cent, as&u«Tiing the fighters would
3be launched and recovered every two hours* There are many
other variables; such as, natural wind velocity, number of
aircraft launched, degree of cover provided by the U* S* Air
Force when within their land based fighter range, etc* As a
good thumb rule, five hundred nautical miles piuc twenty-four
hour period is valid and three hundred nautical miles per
nalcolm w« Cagle and Frank A* Manson, The Sea War in
China (Annapolis: U.S* Naval Institute, 1957), pp» 52^^W.
t^* S. Seventh Fleet units deployed from Buckner Bay, Okinawa,
on July 1, 1950, and launched a pre-dawn strike July 3, 1950,
on targets deep in Korea*
^This is assuming optimum normal conditions with F4
Phantom II aircraft and minimum use of afterburner for en-
durance reasons*
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day is conservative for the fleet's speed of advance under
the conditions which have been assumed in the example.
In addition, mobility provides a moving target to
IG^ type weapons. To date, technology has not solved the
problem posed by this factor* To counter this argument,
opponents claim the fleet movosient schedule is c<»BEwion knowl-
edge and an ICBH pre-emptive strike against naval units could
be made while these units were in port or undergoing repairs*
To preclude another "Pearl Harbor** in this marner, major
fleet units (especially aircraft carriers) are never to be
found in port all at the same time. This principle applies
equally to those stationed in the United States proper as
well as those deployed with the striking fleets on station*
2* Flexibility * If the decision is for armed con-
flict, the complete range of weapons from "H** bomb to small
conventional weapons is available for any gradation of
desired force to be applied*
3* Control of the sea * This insures logistic sup-
port of any venture attempted, and by the same token denies
logistic support to the enemy by sea* The Berlin airlift
clearly demonstrated any major continuous logistic support
by air is prohibitive in cost* The sea is, and will remain
for the foreseeable future, the most practical and inexpen-
sive means of transportation for bulk cargo and personnel.
A bonus factor is the ability to blockade—an effetetive
#7 7w^.A»^ i'OXVQH A fl^AJtWiMB




«cononic weapon. The recent Cuban crisis is eloquent testi-
nony to the use f naval blockade; however, there may be
legal disadvantages as a result* The naval blockade of
China has heen discussed as a possible fona of economic co-
ercion*
4. Command and control of naval forces * Through
modern communications, complete control can be exercised
from Washington, 0* C« This is to prevent a local military
coanand from inadvertently causing escalation of a conflict*
5* Fleets can be employed in interne -Jonal waters *
The decision maker is not faced with violation of the terri-
torial sovereignty of a third power, nor is the third power
embarrassed by a request for use of its transient facilities*
By presenting a teurget on the high l \r ^ civilians are not
involved nor is a friendly power inviting attack because our
offensive military strength is based in that country. In
contrast to the limited dependence of the Navy on foreign
bases ( supra , p* 75), the U* S* Air Force and U* S* Army are
heavily dependent on such bases* On the positive side of
the ledger, these bases reduce reaction time, increase combat
radius, compel a potential enemy to disperse his defenses.
4See Department of State Bulletin , Vol* 28, March 16,
1953, p* 414, for commenEs by General C^ar Bradley in his
capacity as Chairman Joint Chiefs of staff | or Vol* 31,
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and bring to bear iit«diuj»-range U* S* Air Force weapons
systems \i^ich could not otherwise be effective* On the
negative side, foreign bases create local friction, become
fixed targets for the enemy (thus endangering the local
populace), augment the adverse national flow of gold, and
5tend to be regarded as neocolonialism.
6Time Magazine gave a favorable impression of our
overseas bases | however, considering ICBM capability, the
intense nationalism and the ill will these bases sometimes
create, it appears that Neal Stafford is more nearly correct
when he states:
• • • scientific technology and advances in weap«*
oneering may have outdated foreign bases as far as
the United States is concerned, but they do not out-
mode allies ."^
Of all the incidents t#hich jeopardized the American
overseas air base program, the most famous was the Powers
U-2 affair which took place on May 1, I960* The Soviet ver-
8
sion and the Francis Powers* trial were given wide publicity
and created a great deal of propaganda value for left-wing
Townsend Hoopes, '^Overseas Bases in American Stra-
tegy," Forei^ Affairs (October 1958), p* 92.
6
"Overseas Bases: Durable Assets," Time , July 4, I960.
7Neal Stafford, "Our Changing Military Policy,"
Foreign Policy Bulletin (Vol* 39, Mo* 20), July 1, 1960, p*
155.
a
"The Trial of the U-2," (Chicago: Translation World
Publishers, 1960), pp. 1-158*
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•^••nts in those nations from which U-2 flights could
originate. The incident caused very unfavorable reaction in
Japan to the Kishi govensnent * s renewal of the Japanese-
American treaty which provided bases in Japan to Ukiited
9States forces* This treaty included naval bases as well as
U* 5* Air Force and U. S* Army installations*
In addition, Indonesia, Malaya, and the Philippines
recently issued a joint statement in which they agreed that
t«af>orary foreign bases should not be allowed to be used by
**Big Powers** to subvert the national independence of the
three countries* A recent newspaper article states:
None of SSATO*s members has shown any enthusiasm
for the organization of late and many, in candid
moments, admit it is just what the Communist Chinese
accuse it of being, "a paper tiger***
But the bases are something else again, parti-
cularly if Indonesia chooses to emphasise the idea
that the three countries will abstain from the use
of arrangements of collective defense to serve the
particular intfurests of any of the powers*
U* S* and British officials certainly are not
pressing for any clarification at this point .^^
6* Qround support is available . Lebanon is the
classic example where the decision maker, through deployed
Marine Corps units attached to the fleet, could, if desired.
9Norman A. Graebner, Cold War Diplomacy , 1945-1960
(Princetons Nostrand, Inc*, 1962), pp* 104-57
Warren Unna, "Air Bases At Issue,** The Washington
Post, August 12, 1963, p. A-6*
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operate ashore* Th\is, with air drop or oonventional logis-
tic support coiae to the aid of a friendly foreign power or
establish a beachhead*
?• Psychological weapon * Naval units provide ideal
weapons for propaganda and psychological warfare* By subtle
combination and employment, the fleet can provide the cosh-
plete spectrum of military posture frost threat to an enemy
to inspiring confidence in our allies*
®* Sconomic tools . In a limited manner , through
political decision, the fleet can provide an economic lever
to help achieve political ends* This is amplified in Chapter
IV of this papcur*
^* Choice of alternatives * This consideration
(except for the fleet's actual military capability) presents
the decision maker with the critical tool he needs* Above
all in today's complex and entangled political developments,
it is mandatory that the politician have a wide range of
alternatives with which he can project the influence of the
United States qualitatively and quantitatively* The Seventh
Fleet provides such an instrument under specific circum«>
stances and situations where ovcuct military power is required
within reasonable range of the Seventh Fleet's radius of
action*
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II. THE DISADVANTAGES PACING THE SEVENTH FLEET
Thtt Seventh Pl««t is quite i»pot«nt to counter guer«>
cillas and the slow subversion of weak governments on the
mainland of Asia^-priaarily a political problem* As the
nature of the struggle in these areais is political, and the
military tactics represent an unorthodox combat approach,
vis«-^*-vis the American military posture, the Seventh Fleet
cannot cope with the existing problems by a totally military
solution* Small units using agitprop and terror cannot be
countered by the Seventh Fleet as a practical military
problem. However, to effect finally the control of a coun-
try, armies of conventional size and strength CiUSt be
employed, using to a degree conventional tactics* Unfor-
tunately, current history can produce the corpses of govern-
ments which fell (almost invariably) once the guerrilla
movement became strong enough to produce army-size units*
Two specific cases ares Prench-Indo China and the prime
example for the world. Communist China*
You cannot use weapons to kill ideas, nor can you
destroy targets that are not to be Meen» The core of the
current problem is stated succinctly) the great danger is
that Connunist China will give military support to indigenous
insurrectionary groups and the Peking relationship to these
insurrectionary forces will be so ambiguous and disguised,
tU no a^man-L ^-oXt rui «/.
^•flX^ (Starrs? srl.^ , a-TLr-.f^.i^c f^amA ...
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that threats of retaliation against China may be ineffective
as a deterrent. The problem, therefore, can be simply
proposed as one of internal security against Communist-
inspired revolutionists guided and given the military ca-
pacity by Peking*
The revolutionists have made a wise choice of weapons*
12
unconventional warfare and protracted conflict techniques.
The objective of conventional combat is to win a
state by defeating the enemy's military forces in the
field. In contrast, the strategy of unconventional
forces must be to win control of the state by first
winning control of the civil population. 13
The obvious answer to this strategy is to fight fire with
fire. The British in Kalaya have achieved soane degree of
14
success with this approach, but it is readily apparent
that the Seventh Pl<Mst is not, and probably will not, be
modified in mission or capability to assume major responsi-
bilities in this mode of conflict. Central to the United
States approach to solution of insurgency problems in
A. Doak Barnett, Communist China arAv. jia (New Yorkt
Random House, 1960), p. 143.
12Robert Strauas-Hupe , et al
.
, Protracted Conflict
(New York: Harper and Bros.,'T95?). The concepts discussed
in this publication are central to the understanding of the
overall contemporary conflict being waged in the Par East.
13Franklin A. Lindsay, "Unconventional Warfare,"
Foreign Affairs (January 1962), p. 264.
14Franklin M. Osanka (ed.), Modern Guerrilla warfare
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15Southeast Asia is thet strategic haalet program* This ob-
viously, by its vary nature, is primiurily a U* S« Ansy
16
mission and Seventh Fleet participation will be mininal*
Thus, the changing nature of power has not invali-
dated the Seventh Fleet as a political-military tool, but it
has established distinct limits to the form, application and
timing of its capability*
Roger Hilsman, "The. Answer to Exported Aggression,"
The General Electric Forum t April-June 1963, p. 21.
16One of the better collection of articles on the
problem of insurgency is "Readings in Counterinsurgency,
1963," U. Sm Military Academy, West Point, New York, com-
piled by the Academy's Department of Social Sciences*
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CHAPTER VI
MAJOR FAR EASTERN POLITICAL PROBLEMS
OP THE FUTURE
This chag^ter represents an attempt to discuss major
Par Eastern political problems of the future without refer-
ence to the Seventh Fleet. Chapter VII, C^i^lusions, then,
will be a synthesis of Chapters I«>V and this chapter* Be*
cause future Far Eastern political issues represent a
loyical extension of past and present problems, there will
be minor repetitions of material found in previous chapters
to establish the required conceptual framework with which to
develop conclusions*
I* COHMUNI^ai
The four main goals of Communism as outlined by Neal
Stafford are:
1* A more active and militant policy for the under-
developed worlds-eradication of all western influences
political, economic, and military*
2* Intensification of the class struggle and support
of ^national democracies • **
3* Strengthening of military defenses*
s ^n»«e ajMfB»t l:llIo4 m xe' x •«ir«9
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4« The United States is the major enemy and anti-
American propaganda must be increased.
Due to the recent trends in polycenterism found within
the Communist camp, with the wide schism between Moscow and
Peking being the paramount example, a clarification of the
term Communism is mandatory* As discussed in this chapter,
consider the variant to be the Leninist-Stalinist-Maoist
version* The ideology, means to achieve desired ends, pat-
terns of economic and social problems, and the historical
base of colonialism in the area all tend to favor the Peking
concept of Communism over that of the Moscow version* The
latter form daily grows more conservative in nature as the
standards of living in the Soviet Union more nearly approxi-
laate those of the Uhited States and Western Europe*
A review of Chinese Communist **great leap" and subse-
quent events clearly develops the Chinese pattern and bid
for the Communist leadership of the underdeveloped world*
The high rate of increase in China's industrial
and agricultural production is of great political
significance * • • * Externally, the fast rate at
which industrial and agricultural production is
developing in China will greatly strengthen the
whole socialist camp, while the peoples in Asia,
Africa and Latin America, who have Just freed, or
are freeing themselves, from colonial rule, will
Neal Stcifford, "^Communism * s Pour Main Groals,"
Foreign Policy Bulletin . Vol* 40, No. 9, January 15, 1961,
p* 67*
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draw confidence and strength In their struggle for
a better life from China's experience in her big
leap*^
The "great leap" and its overspill effects had wide
and lasting consequences in Sino-Soviet affairs* The clash
of interests was in two primary areas: ideological and mat-
ters of practical consideration*
The "great leap" had as a practical consideration a
tremendous reliance on Soviet technical aid and material.
As the rift between the Cosuaunist giants widened} Soviet aid
w€Ui slowly withdrawn; however, some rel«.ef was given Peking
in regard to payment of loans* The figures given in the Far
Eastern Sconomic Review 1962 Yearbook reflects this as fol-
lows!
Despite political differences of opinion and their
inevitable inroads on economic cooperation, the Rus-
sians conceded a period of grace for the repayment
of $320 million trade deficit which China incurred
with the U*S*S*R* during I960* In effect, the Chinese
were able to ignore this figure during 1961, but they
were expected to make a token start of repayment
during 1962, and to repay the greater part of the debt
during 1963-1965* Chinese exports to Russia fell in
I960 to about half their 1959 level while imports from
the U.S.S.R* in 1960 were only about SlOO million less
than the $950 million recorded in 1959*3
2Hsueh Mu-Chiao, The Socialist Transformation of the
National Economy in China (Peking: Foreign Language ?ress
,
i960), p* 269*
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As Slno-Sovlet tensions increased > economic teamwork dete-
riorated proportionately*
Of a much graver nature was the ideological conflict
which many writers link to Moscow *s contemporary posture
viS'^i-vis Peking* To underestimate the effect of Chinese
Communist press\u:e on the Soviets is to make a serious error
as to how deep the power struggle is betvreen the U.S.S.R*
and Peking* One of the first open ideological conflicts
took place over the commune system* On July 18, 1959,
Khrushchev made a speech in Poland in which he stated
t
* • * that the Chinese in setting up communes had
a '*poor understanding" of how to build Communism*
Referring to the early Soviet experience with com-
munes » he said they were a dismal failure because
neither the material nor political prerequisites for
then existed* Those "people" who wanted to set them
up in the U*S*S*R*y he said, "had a poor understand*
ing of what Communism is and how it is to be built"
• * • * Khrushchev's indirect but unmistakable attack
on the Chinese communes was clearly premeditated and
carefully executed *4
The differences of opinion over the Chinese institute
ing communes led to other major schisms* The Chinese bid
for revolutionary leadership as the true defenders of
Marxism-»Leninism-stalini8m remains with us today* It was
clearly evidenced in Peking's denunciation of Moscow on
4Donald S. Zagoria, The Sino«"Soviet Conflict > 1957-
1961 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962), p* 134*
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5January 1, 1963* The radical innovations attempted by the
"great leap" and its early partial successes nay have con-
vinced Mao that, as a theorist, his Chinese nodel was
superior to the Soviet sMsdel for practical application by
the underdeveloped nations*
Perhaps at the root of Chinese dissatisfaction
with Soviet strategy in the underdeveloped areas was
the desire of the Chinese to replace the Russians as
the leadcurs of the revolutionary movement there. Such
aspirations were best revealed by the bold revival in
1959 and 1960 of Chinese claims that Maoist theory and
Chinese revolutionary experience were valid for under-
developed areas, and, by implication, that Soviet
theory and revolutionary experience were not*^
The Soviet reply cane largely in the form of the 1960
Moscow Declaration wherein Lenin's cooperative pltm, not the
communes, was held to be valid in both underdeveloped and
advanced countries* A second point made was that a "material
base" was said to have been necessary for the transition to
Coitmunism* An obvious reference to the industrial back-
wardness of China* The declaration also made note that
higher productivity must be achieved through technical prog-
ress (here the Chinese stressed nanpo%#er), economic planning
(the "great leap" was most assuredly remiss in adequate
planning), and strict observance of material incentives (the
commune system for the most part categorically d^iied this
5
The Washington Post . January 1, 1963*
6
zagoria, op * cit., p* 266*
x^
oiij i'^ i.'vj'^^ituj^^ •ooi^A'vonn' >~-ite-x «1T ^»t9t' ' x^ml**^
iio2:J i *'- - :«. .jLb ••sfttiO %© toon *r!i ie Rqmfi^**
iii Lqi^m
•-sobnu IK'
iAii^ 9ioa »b4« o«Xi» xio^^«XGiI:>*t} MiT ^iMliO to ««oabiow
o^Ai/pofto aX i«iaou Y-^twivta* ^aoa a*w "^qooX 4«oxtf " aoU)
92
aspect as being "capitalistic** )• A sraall concession was
given to vinese views by acknowledgment that higher produc-
tivity could be achieved by **heightening the political con-
sciousness of the p<K>ple«**
A further issue which the Soviets played up during
the period was the anti-Stalinists "cult of personality"
line* This, of course, could be, and is frequently, inter-
preted as a direct reflection on Mao*
These, then, were some of the cc^ntral considerations
and issiies between the Soviets and C<Hmunist Chinese during
the "great leap" period* Obviously, they are not solved
today; and, in fact, since the Cuban crisis, they have be-
come graver and graver problems for the Communist bloc*
Problems have become so serious that the ClJLnese have estab*
lished their ovm "iron curtain" against Soviet Russia in the
form of a fortified belt twenty miles deep and hundr<ids of
7
miles long*
The pending area of conflict in the international
milieu is between the so-called "backward countries" or
"underdeveloped areas" with their "rising expectations"
which are not being met, and the high standard of living,
"status quo" areas: in short the "north-south" cold war.
It transcends in importance the east-west cold war which is
7
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largely in stalemate statiia and cannot be resolved due to
''Pax Atomica*'* With po8t->World War 11 recovery, the Soviet
IMion has becoBie more of a "status quo** power than a revi->
sionist power, and thus the eaLst->west conflict is a dying
issue. The U«S*S«R.~U* S« military and psychological pos*-
tures vis—it-vis each will continue* The constant sparring
and occasional militaury incident will contin\ie to occur;
each ideological system is the avowed enemy of the other to
death—but neither intends the death to be premature through
a nuclear exchange. Thus, through evolution, western capi-
talism hecomes socialistic and Soviet communism moves towards
capitalism* This is unacceptable to Communist China*
As the greatest revolutionary state in the world
today, Communist China represents dynamic action in the
attempt to solve the grave economic problems of the under-
develofHsd nations* The need is so great among the "have not**
nations, that by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation
and Development figures, aid in the form of government
grants and loans of all kinds by the west, v^en added today,
may reach between $7*8 and $8*7 billion per year* Yet,
according to united Nations estimates, if over a billion
developing people are to increase their growth rate from
2 or 3 p^r cent to 5 or 6 per cent and keep ahead of the
Cf
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population explosion, the aid figure must increase to SIO or
S$12 billion annually*
As an external influence, the appeal of the intent
and purpose of the "great leap" has a tremendous "psycho-
logical punch" to the underdeveloped nations* Although the
"leap" was a dismal failure—in terms of the material goals
established-—the concept itself and the message regarding
its jsethod (i*e*, the Chinese brand of Communism) cannot be
overlooked or disregarded* For the pending conflict between
the "have" and "have not" nations, the "have nots" are
searching for an effective tool to further their cause*
Mao*s answer, in the form of peasants revolution and Chinese
Communist support, finds massive understanding and sympathy
throughout the underdeveloped %iK>rld* In short, the pro->
Cewtinist nations and elements of the impoverished areas of
the world are split in their loyalties between the Moscow
and Peking centers of Communist thought*
In conclusion, the masses of Asia are being denied
their demands which are crystallised and termed "rising
expectations*" The population explosion alone is grave
enough to offset normal gains in standards of living, but
this factor is compounded by crushing poverty and general
8Barbara Ward Jackson, "Foreign Aid: Strategy or
Stopgap," Foreign Affairs (October 1962), p* 97*
'.
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illiteracy. The native peoples of the world are just begin<-
ning to feel the extent of their relative backwardness and
modem oomnxmication media increase their hypersensitivity
in this regard* To retain power, native leaders miist
promise near miraculous results} and they are failing in
their goals* As the native looks around him, he is given
Commimist China, not Japan or the Soviet Union, as the great
leader to solve the problems of Asia* This is the crux of
the problem as there is sympathy and understanding through
conmon economic and social goals which transcend for the
moment the knowledge of the political policies and pressures
used to achieve results under the Chinese Communist system*
Until Communism can be proven a false solution to meet the
9
challenge of the underdeveloped world, it must be anti-
cipated that Communism as a method to achieve social and
economic change will appeal to, and be atccepted by, most of
the masses of the low income per capita peoples of the worldi
and that democracy in the western sense of the term is com-
pletely misunderstood and alien to th<^* The emctrgence of
new independent states is often accompanied by violence,
9See "The Developing Nations,'* The General Electric
Forum , October-December 1963; and ''Economic, Social and
Political Change in the Underdeveloped Countries and Its
Implications for U* S* Policy," Study No* 12, U* £. Foreign
Policy * prepared for Senate Foreign ReTations cbaimittee
,
March 30, 1960*
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unccKTtaijity as to coiirse of action « and smoldering reaent-
MRts against th«iir former colonial masters. All of this is
accompanied by the ever-present poverty and backwardness of
their people* It is the perfect environment for the seeds
of Communism to mature* The only factor which offsets this
bleak picture is that generally a nation is born with a high
fever of nationalism which will resist imperialistic Com-
munism—
-JUf the danger is recognised*
II * NATIONALISM
* • • nationalism means the rebuilding of our
nations; it means the effort to provide equal esteem
for oiu: peoples; it means the det«unnination to take
our future in our ovm hands • * • • Nationalism may
be an out-of^-date doctrine for many in this world;
for us of Asia and Africa it is the mainspring of our
efforts (repeated)* To understand Asia and Africa,
we must understand nationalism*
10President Siikarno of Indonesia
The forces of nationalism and its influence on the
international scene should not be underestimated* To the
industrialized west, in a sense, nationalism represents the
search for freedom under law as the organizing principle of
11human society* To the aewly energing and largely former
From an address by President Sukarno to a joint
meeting of the Senate and House of Representatives, May 17,
1956, Congressional Record . May 17, 1956, p* 7524*
Barbara Ward , Five Ideas That Changed the World
(New York: Norton and Co*, 1959), p. 33*
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colonial areas of the great powcurs, nationallaia is a tool to
be used to fight laperialists and create cohesive forces in
their own country* For these new nations, political inde~
pendence and national identity in world affairs are issues
which rate top value priorities* The fanatic zeal with
which the intense nationaulisiB is pursued forecasts grave
probleras in a world, which for the older more stable nations,
is a world noving towards the brealcdown of tight impemeable
territorial entities which jealously guard their sovereign
rights to the exclusion of all others*
Iftifortunately, nationalism is a psychological atti-
tude and, therefore, will be difficult to moderate* The
greatest hope to combat excessive emotional nationalism is
the factor of time (which perhaps events will not allow) and
a gradual awareness of world interdependence in areas of
trade and consnerce* In addition, the reliance by the emerg-
ing nations on the more advanced countries for aid and
technical skills cannot be disregarded by them. l4ot the
least of the influences will be participation in the Uhited
Nations and a growing recognition that independence has with
it the "baggage of responsibility" to world order which can-
not be denied*
Communism frequently regards virulent nationalism as
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12
an Ideal locale for expansion | however, "traditional na-
tionalism sought to free the nation froa alien domination
13
and give it a state of its ownt" and thus national inter-
est continually thwarts hegomonic CoHsunism and polycenteriam
appears or Communism is rejected completely. In general,
today in Asia, many who are successful revolutionaries
espousing the Communist cause, are primarily nationalists
who demand social and economic change and are truly patriotic
to their country—not to Red China or to the Soviet Union*
It is a dangerous game and in the Far East has built-in
traps which favor Chinese Communist infiltration.
Graebner is rather explicit on this point} he sayst
C(»maunisffl in Asia, as in Europe, remained subser-
vient to nationalism • • • • Even in the CoROsunist
countries of Asia, nationalism remained the chief
determinant, and no quantity of Soviet arms would
undermine its primacy unless they were accompanied
by significant nifflibers of Russian troops .^^
To the west, intense nationalism Imposes a distinct
barrier to free world efforts to aid Asia. As wais previously
noted, the vast areas of Asia were largely tjmder western
12
"Blueprint of Revolution," Moscow University Herald .
December 9, 1951, quoted in Department' of State Bulletin ,
Vol. 27, pp. 97-103. Initial steps of revolution ares (1)
incite nationalism, (2) promote national front, (3) Commu-
nists take over leadership of the national front ... etc.
13Hans J. Morganthau, Politics Among Nations (third
edition; New York: Knopf, I960;, p. 336.
14Norman A. Graebner, Cold War Diplomacy . 1945-1960
(Princeton: Nostrand, Inc., T957)
,
p. 12l.
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colonial rule or western sphere of influence* Thus, a fom
of nationalist conflict with the west is generated
• • « by colonial revolutions and their aftermath*
No subject people can become free of alien control
without first developing a keen sense of nationalistic
particularism and making the achievement of independ-
ence a primary objective* When independence is
achieved, the hatreds that evolved through the strug-
gle for self-determination continue and forra a
significant part of the policy of the new state
toward their former colonial masters .^^
III. ANTI-WHITE COLONIALI^
One of the most lasting effects of the heritage of
the colonial past is a strong anti-colonial feeling on the
part of most Asians which is coupled with a strong sensi-
tivity to race prejudice* The "loss of face" through the
humiliation of colonial rule or imposed extraterritoriality
is difficult for the average westerner to conprehen :• IRie
American thinks of the Philippine venture in 1898 as a
himanitarian gesture and regards pre-World War II relations
with China as the united States being the defender cf
Chinese territorial integrity through the "open door"
policy—little understanding that the Asian of today be-
lieves that the Uhited States participated in the humilia-
tion of China and Asia through '^passive" or '*econonic
15Charles 0* Lerche and Abdul A* Said, Concepts of
Intejmational Politics (Snglewood Cliffs: Prentice-kalTTi
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InperiallsiQ'* with equal guilt as the great empire builders
of the nineteenth century*
The legacy of the colonial past and the problems it
imposes range fromi western administrative methods, eco-
nomic development directed toward the needs of the colonial
power rather than an Asian market, educational systems which
intensified class differences, and not the least of the
problems is the creation of artificial frontiers of colonial
domination which met the convenittice of European power
politics with little regard of the native populations that
they were imposed upon* The reaction of Asia can be seen in
the "spirit of Bandung" and recent appeals for "Asian soli-
darity*"
Anti--white colonialism represents a major emotional
and psychological appeal upon which the peoples of Asia and
Africa can unify—and P^ing is well aware of it* As the
West attempts to project its political Influence through
military, economic or propaganda means, there is an immedi-
ate distxrust of intentions by the people of Asia*
The exception to anti-white colonialism, in general,
is the Soviet Union* By arguing, the satellites of Eastern
Europe are, in fact, hostages of Soviet Imperialism, in the
»mmm sense that Asia was humiliated by the West, does not
ring true or can convince an Asiam—simply because the situa-
tion is confined to the white races*
mi
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Ona of the most striking rttmarks jragarding the suc-
cesses of Conrnnmisn and democracy is made by Hans Horganthau
and focus on the role of anti-colonialism* He states:
Comunisa has been successful wherever its tenets
of social, economic, and political equality appeal
to people for whoa the removal of inequality has
been the most urgent aspiration* Western philosophy
has succeeded wherever in popular aspirations poli-
tical liberty has taken precedence over all other
needs* Thus Communism has largely lost the struggle
for the minds of men in Central euid Eastern Europe*
and democracy has by and large been defeated in Asia*
* • * %/here democracy lost out in Asia, it did so bex-
cause its appeal was largely divorced from the life
experiences and interests of the peoples of Asia*
What the p€K>ples of Asia want above everything else
is freedom from western colonialism*^^
IV* THE Mill POWER QUESTION
The proliferation of atomic weapons has long been the
subject and concern of the major powers who have the respon-
sibility of nuclear weapons and compatible delivery systems*
To date, the Ubitcid States and Soviet Rv 3sia have by far the
great preponderance of nuclear weapon strength* Great
Britain has the capability to produce quality weap<ms and
weapons systems, but lacks ths ctconomic ability to conpete*
France has not, to date, produced quality, quantity, nor a
suitable weapons delivery system) however, these are avowed
aims of French policy* The core of the argument is that
16Morganthau, op * cit * . p* 341*














thftse nations represent stable and rational political coun-
tries.
Central to the problem is that science and technology
may produce low-cost easy-to-manufacture atomic weapons* The
hazards then become sanifold and complex as nations who lack
a nature sense of responsibility or technical competence may
get nuclear weapons* The four basic ways total war could
17
start, other than by policy decisionf are:
1. War by mechanical failure or human miscalculation*
2* Unauthorized action*
3* False alarm*
4 • Brinkmanship *
It is obvious, on the surface, that the chances of
nuclear war by one of the above methods are multiplied com-
pletely out of proportion for safety by the "Ntt" power
problem*
Particulairly discovu:aging is the attitude of Commu-
nist China in regard to the utility of nuclear war* Chou
En-lai, with a complete indifference to morality, in 1956, is
reported to have said that after the next war there will be
"twenty sdllion Americans, five million Englishmen, fifty
18
million Russians, and three hundred million Chinese left***
17Amital i^tzioni, The Hard Way to Peace (New Yorks
Colliers, 1962), pp. 45-577"






The bitterness of current Peking attacks on Moscow
regarding promised aid in the nuclear energy field indicate
the Russians are as reluctant to see the proliferation of
atoiaic weapons as is the West* In addition, the vencMn dis-
played over this issue would tend to lead one to the conclu-
sion that the cyjLnese Cc»BHunists are having considerable
difficulty in developing a nuclear capability. Fortunately
»
what is frequently ovcurlooked is that it is one thing to
make atomic weapcms and another natter cootpletely to develop
suitable delivery systems.
One author paints a particularly discouraging picture
of Io'.'v-coa u y five—thousand—po\md nuclear weapons which could
be used in conjunction with Boeing 707 passenger-type air-
19
craft with modifications* Considering the tresMOidous eae-
penditures and technical skills involved in present United
States weapons and systems, it is difficult to reconcile the
simple "do-it-yourself'^ nuclear warfare theory advanced by
Mr. Bagdikian with the realities of the contemporary state
of the art.
In any event, the question of the "Ntk** power is a real
political issue, and the mo&t critical nation in this regard
must be considered Communist China. It can only be
19Ben H. Bagdikian, "AtosULc Bombs for Bveryone,**
Saturday Evening Post (March 2, 1963), p. 26*
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speculation as to how soon Peking will have nuclear weapons
in quantity and suitable delivery vehicles* American and
Soviet policy makers must plan for that day, as it is a
capability Communist China is almost certain to achieve*
btiM flAollOMlA •8»X9lll»r ri^vli*^ nXdi^^.^Vt frnr ffl
CHAPTER YII
CONCLUSIONS
The problttn facing the American political decision
maker in the Par Cast is; to control a massive social
revolution which is highlighted by fanatical nationalism,
anti-white colonialism and a demand for better standards of
living currently phrased as "rising expectations.** Due to
the population explosion and the inhercuit social evils found
almost universally in the 8o->called "backward" areas of the
world, most attempts by the high income and high consumption
nations to help these poverty stricken countries are failing*
The masses of the Far East demand change* In so doing, they
look to Communism, and, in particular, Communist China as
the ideal to further their cause, create a short«»cut to
economic success, and provide the leadership for the "south
element'* (underdeveloped nations) against the **north ele-
ment" (industrialised nations) in the pending north-south
conflict of interests which is rapidly displacing the east-
west "cold war" as paramount in importance.
The weapons selected by the leaders of this revolu-
tion are ideally suited to the conditions which prevail.
These weapons are primarily political and psychological in
nature and through the "protracted conflict" concept, the
political ends of revolutionary Leninist-Stalinist-Maoist
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CcMHRunisiii can be gained in piecemeal fashion. The military
aspect of the threat today varies from terror tactics to
guerrilla operations of ixifiltration and ambush with terrain
»
climate and the sympathetic response of the peasant to
assist* The military threat of the future may more closely
approximate that of the traditional mass and maneuver, but
for the immediate present is confined to the lower end of
the spectjrum of violence* The spectrum of violence for
which we must be prepared can be considered to have three
levels: "(1) massive retaliatory (deterrent) the ultimate
reserve, (2) mobile limited warfare (brush fire), and (3)
political warfare force (small arms; sticks and stones)*"
The Seventh Fleet's contribution to the United States
military posture in the Far East vis-^-vis the spectrum of
violence can be considered as follows s level one-^augmenting
the U* 3* Air Force Strategic Air Coanand today* For the
future, a great reduction in manned aircraft with a nuclear
capability and an increased responsibility bm more Polaris
weapons syst«a submarines arrive on station; level two*»the
Seventh Fleet is ideally suited to support indigenous forces
or U* S* Army contingents at the "brush fire" level of c<Hi<-
flict which are found within its normal operating radius of
Franklin M* Osanka, Modern Guerrilla Warfare (New
York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1962), p* 417*
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action I level three-under unique circumstances the Seventh
Fleet might engage in another **Lebanon** type operation;
however, in general at this level in the Far Sast, the
Seventh Fleet is usually impotent except for the **fringe
benefit" operations described previously in Chapter IV.
Due to the intense social and economic forces which
foment violence and unrest in the area, the '*political war-
fax^ force" will remain a constant reality for the U« S*
Department of State to counter for the foreseeable future*
Thus, the Seventh Fleet's relevance to the immediate mili-
tary problem is somewhat circumscribed because of the nature
of means used and envircmment which the enemy has selected
to operate within*
In retrospect, the Seventh Fleet has provided the
political policy maker with a valid political^military tool*
The Seventh Fleet has had varying degrees of military sue-
cess and political impact, dependent on the specific situa-
tion and its use* There have been great psychological
victories for the United States due prisiarily to the Seventh
Fleet. The immediate response in Korea, the success of our
stated military policy vis-il-vist Formosa, Quemoy and Matsu
Islands, the Tachcm Islands evacuation and the Hainan inci-
dent of July 1954—all added prestige to the Seventh Fleet*
In addition, for the most part the Fleet has created good
will and inspired confidence that the United States has the
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capability, and will use this capability, to honor its
political commitments with regard to overt aggression* In
the cases cited, the Sey«:xth Fleet provided the tangible
evidence of United States intentions. It would be reniss
not to acknowledge the significant contribution that the
U* S* Strategic Air Command has nade in holding the Soviet
Uhion and Conanunist China in check* The full extent of
SAC* 8 ccmtribution to the success of these naval operations
may never be known*
In view of the fact that the non-military elements of
conflict are largely political in nature and psychological
in execution, the importance of Formosa to the free virorld
and its influence on the sixteen million Overseas Chinese«~-
(a major minority element in practically every country in
Southeast Asia)->-*cannot be dismissed lightly* Many dis-
tinguished political leaders and writers have drawn exact
parallels between the positions of Free Berlin and Formosa
in the ideological and psychological warfare the Uhited
States is engaged in* In addition, a free Formosa has direct
political implications to the question regarding recognition
and the membership of Communist China to the United Nations*
Both of these areas are of vital concern to the policy of
the IMited States as l<Mig as the agencies of the United
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Considering th« technical knowledge required, the
financial cost involved (both combined with Soviet reluc-
tance to see Red China as a nuclear power), it does not
appear that China will becc^ne an effective "Ntk" power in the
iaimedlate future* Nor for the sasie reasons a seapower which
can challenge the United States command of sea within any
foreseeable time span*
In summation t the United States Seventh Fleet has
had, does have, and will have, psychological and military
value which, in turn, creates political impact in the Far
Sast* The nature of power is changing constantly { however,
the Seventh Fleet has sufficiently modified and updated its
weapons and doctrine to have met the challenge within its
mission L^iid the principles of seapower upon which it is
based rsmaLln essentially valid* Only if the day eurrives
that Communist China successfully takes th6 island of
PoraK>sa by means of overt military force, contrary to the
stated aims of United States policy, can the Seventh Fleet
be written off as no longer capable of creating political
impact in the Far Cast*
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